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The past several years have witnessed considerable growth in the
power and number of New York governmental consumer protection
agencies. New and potent statutory powers have been granted to the
Attorney General.' At the local level, cities, ' counties,3 and towns4
have created consumer agencies and granted many of them enforce-.
ment and rulemaking powers.5 Legislation on all levels of state gov-
ernment regulates an increasing number of commercial activities for
the protection of consumers.' That legislation has likewise led to
greater cooperation among state and local consumer agencies.7 This
Comment will examine the structures and powers of the various
New York State government agencies which protect consumers from
deceptive acts and practices,' and evaluate the effectiveness of these
agencies in combatting consumer deceptions.
1. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1972); N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 349 (McKinney Supp. 1974). See also text accompanying notes
45-119 infra.
2. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 64, §§ 2201-04 (1972); Yon-
kers, N.Y., Ordinance 2, Jan. 12, 1971.
3. See, e.g., NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.0
(Supp. 1973) (enacted June 9, 1967); Erie County, N.Y., Ordinance 20
(1973); Rockland County, N.Y., Ordinance 5, Oct. 19, 1970.
4. See, e.g., Huntington, N.Y., Ordinance 8, Oct. 19, 1971; Ramapo,
N.Y., Ordinance 1, March 22, 1972.
5. See, e.g., NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.2
(Supp. 1973); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, §§ 2203d-
2.0 to -7.0 (Supp. 1974); Huntington, N.Y., Ordinance 8, Oct. 19, 1971.
6. See, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 193-h (McKinney Supp. 1974)
(requiring unit pricing of consumer commodities in food stores); Suffolk
County, N.Y., Ordinance 17, Nov. 9, 1971 (providing for the licensing of
certain occupations); East Greenbush, N.Y., Ordinance 2, Nov. 8, 1971
(regulating hawking and peddling).
7. The New York State Consumer Protection Board was established in
part to facilitate communication and cooperation among state and local
consumer agencies. See notes 120-37 infra and accompanying text. The
Regional Consumer Council, a non-governmental consumer organization
consisting of many federal, state, and local consumer agencies in the New
York City area, is active in fostering cooperation among its members. See
1974 N.Y. REGIONAL CONSUMER PROTECTION COUNCIL, PRO BONO PUBLICO
LEGAL COUNSEL PROGRAM ANN. REP. [hereinafter cited as 1974 N.Y.
REGIONAL COUNCIL REP.]; note 136 infra and accompanying text.
8. The phrase "deceptive acts and practices" originated in the Federal
CONSUMER PROTECTION
I. Introduction-Governmental Approaches to the Problem of
Consumer Deception
Sellers hold great advantages' in dealing with consumers, and in
most instances,' 0 it is simply not practical for a defrauded consumer
to seek redress."
Trade Commission Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970)). It has been adopted in both state and local
legislation. See text accompanying notes 29-119, 150-221 infra. For a gen-
eral discussion of the inadequacy of the doctrine of "caveat emptor" in the
marketplace, see W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MAR-
KETPLACE: THE PLIGHT OF THE AMERICAN CONSUMER (1969) [hereinafter
cited as MAGNUSON].
9. Where the.consumer is poor and uneducated, the seller's advantages
reach the point of dominance. See D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 12-
30 (1963); FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL
SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS, IN THE GHETTO
MARKETPLACE 76-107 (F. Sturdivant ed. 1968).
10. The enforcement of state antitrust laws is beyond the scope of this
Comment. The present inquiry is directed toward state and local govern-
mental agencies dealing with those consumer deceptions that do not in-
volve any violation of state or federal antitrust laws. Magnuson lists and
describes those schemes the Federal Trade Commission says are most
responsible for fleecing the public. They include bait and switch advertis-
ing, chain-referral selling, free gimmicks, charity swindles, business oppor-
tunity swindles, unsolicited merchandise, phony home improvements,
substandard correspondence and vocational schools, and land-fraud sales.
MAGNUSON 31.
11. Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into
Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 409 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Effective Programs]; see Driscoll, De Minimis Curat
Lex-Small Claims Courts in New York City, 2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 479
(1974). Reasons for the unfeasibility are that the sum involved is too little
to hire an attorney and the indigency requirements of legal aid services
make that source of free counsel unavailable to all but the poorest consum-
ers. Note, Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1005, 1127 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Deceptive Advertising]. Small
claims court is a viable source of redress, but its availability is limited. See
N.Y. CITY CIVIL CT. ACT § § 207, 1801 (McKinney Supp. 1974). In addition,
many consumers will avoid the use of small claims court either because of
their fear of the legal process or because they reason that the time spent
in court and away from employment would prove more costly than any
possible recovery. See MAGNUSON 31, 52-53.
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Government has attacked these problems 2 on several fronts.
State statutes seek to protect the consumer by prescribing particu-
larized courses of dealings in the marketplace, 3 establishing benefi-
cial court procedures, and providing civil remedies to correct abuses
that have traditionally existed. 4 However, the statutes do little to
12. It has been estimated that consumers lose several billion dollars
each year due to deceptive acts of sellers. MAGNUSON 8.
13. See e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 302 (Motor Vehicle Retail Instal-
ment Sales Act), 402 (Retail Instalment Sales Act) (McKinney 1962), as
amended, (McKinney Supp. 1974). Under relevant sections of the Retail
Instalment Sales Act, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 413(10)(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1974), and the Motor Vehicle Retail Instalment Sales Act, id. §
302(13)(b), assignment of wages is prohibited. Compare the N.Y. BANKING
LAW § 356 (McKinney 1971), as amended, § 356(3) (McKinney Supp.
1974). An assignment of earned or future wages given to secure a small loan
from a licensed lender is invalid unless the loan is paid simultaneously
with the execution of an assignment, the assignment is in writing signed
by the borrower and his spouse if married, and the assignor's employer
receives a verified copy of the assignment and a verified statement of the
unpaid amount. Id. See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5231(b) (McKinney Supp.
1974) (exempting ninety percent of wages fiom income execution for instal-
ments therefrom, and one hundred percent if earnings are eighty-five dol-
lars or less per week).
14. For example, section 407(7) of the N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW gives a
buyer an unconditional right to rescind a transaction when the seller has
not disclosed interest rates as an annual percentage figure in complete
conformity with the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81
(1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1609 (Supp. 1m, 1973), at the time
of the sale or within ten days thereafter. Section 427 permits the consumer
to cancel a contract entered into at his home at any time before midnight
of the third business day after signing. Notice of cancellation must be in
writing, and may be delivered by mail. Pressure sales by home solicitors
have led to the enactment of numerous hawker and peddler laws at the
local level. See note 305 infra and accompanying text. With regard to
creditors obtaining default judgments by fraudulent or unconscionable
means, see N.Y. REGIONAL OFFICE, FTC, STAFF REPORT ON DEBT COLLECTION
HEARINGS (1973). Legislation has also provided other forms of relief. Con-
sumer collection cases may now be brought only in the county where the
consumer lives or where the transaction took place. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 503
(f) (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.Y.C. CIVIL CT. ACT § 301(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1974). The clerk of the court is empowered to reject collection suits
sua sponte where venue requirements have not been satisfied, even without
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prevent the wide range of consumer deceptions that exist, and they
often do not provide relief when the amount the victimized con-
sumer seeks to recover is not sufficiently large to make litigation
worthwhile. They afford negligible protection unless other regula-
tory acts co-exist with them.
II. State Jurisdiction Over Deceptive Acts and Practices"
A. Enforcement of Criminal Laws
For many years, the district attorneys and the Attorney General
shared jurisdiction in the enforcement of virtually the only general
deceptive practices statute6 in New York. The statute made false
advertising a misdemeanor; its violation required only an intent to
dispose of or sell the falsely advertised merchandise. 7 Knowledge of
the falsity was not an element of the crime."8 This absence of intent
to deceive made the statute one of strict liability." While its modern
the consumer's presence in court to request the transfer. N.Y.C.P.L.R.
§ 513 (McKinney Supp. 1974). A growing number of statutes require dislo-
sure of weight and volume measures in specified consumer transactions.
See, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 193-h (McKinney Supp. 1974) (re-
quiring unit pricing of consumer commodities in food stores); New York
City Truth in Pricing Law, NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64,
§§ B64-1.0 to -17.0 (Supp. 1973).
15. This section does not deal with those agencies that regulate speci-
fied industries, professions, and activities; this subject is discussed in text
section IV infra.
16. Law of May 10, 1915, ch. 569, [1915] N.Y. Laws 1760 (repealed
1967). This statute was New York's version of the "Printer's Ink Statute."
The original model statute was drafted in 1911 by Printer's Ink Magazine,
and was enacted thereafter with some variation by most states. The statute
made any advertised representation that was "untrue, deceptive, or mis-
leading" a misdemeanor. See Deceptive Advertising 1018-19; Note, The
Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 1018, 1098-1111 (1956) for a
compilation of these statutes.
17. Law of May 10, 1915, ch. 569, [1915] N.Y. Laws 1760 (repealed
1967).
18. Id.
19. People v. Richter's Jewelers, Inc., 291 N.Y. 161, 165-66, 51 N.E.2d
690, 691 (1943). See also United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423, 433 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967); People v. Glubo, 5 N.Y.2d
461, 468-72, 158 N.E.2d 699, 704-05, 186 N.,Y.S.2d 26, 34-36 (1959); People
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day counterpart (Penal Law section 190.20)20 continues this strict
liability feature, it contains "an affirmative defense that the alleg-
edly false or misleading statement was not knowingly or recklessly
made or caused to be made."'" The statute is broad enough to en-
compass a wide variety of deceptive advertising,22 but it has not
provided adequate protection for the consumer because of problems
inherent in enforcing it. These include the unwillingness of prosecu-
tors to institute criminal proceedings against businessmen, the hesi-
tancy of juries to convict under so-called "white collar" penal laws,
and the prosecutors' lack of time to prosecute these cases since they
are considered less serious than those involving physical injury.23
Other criminal statutes prohibit particularized deceptive acts
and practices, but these statutes are even less useful than Penal
v. Garten, 235 App. Div. 641, 255 N.Y.S.2d 823 (2d Dep't 1932); People v.
Kelly, 204 Misc. 145, 147, 122 N.Y.S.2d 248, 250 (Magis. Ct. 1953). How-
ever convictions under former N.Y. PENAL LAW § 421 (Law of May 10, 1915,
ch. 569, [1915] N.Y. Laws 1760 (repealed 1967)) and the present N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 190.20 (McKinney Supp. 1974) have been difficult to achieve
in the absence of proof of larcenous intent. See Dole, Merchant and Con-
sumer Protection: The New York Approach to the Regulation of Deceptive
Trade Practices, 53 CORNELL L. REV.°749, 759 n.63 (1968).
20. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.20 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
21. Id. Defendant has the burden of establishing his affirmative de-
fense at trial by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 25.00(2) (McKinney
1967).
22. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 421 (Law of May 10, 1915, ch. 569, [1915] N.Y.
Laws 1760 (repealed 1967)), the predecessor of present section 190.20, had
been held to encompass "bait advertising," People v. Glubo, 5 N.Y.2d 461,
467, 153 N.E.2d 699, 703, 186 N.Y.S.2d 26, 31-32 (1959), and the advertise-
ment of fictitious price cuts, People v. Minjac Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 320, 151
N.E.2d 180, 175 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1958). A number of other statutes providing
for criminal penalties prohibit false advertising in specific fields of com-
mercial activity. See, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 202-a (McKinney
1972) (false advertising of any food product); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 117
(deceptive advertising by travel agents), 187(2) (deceptive advertising by
employment agents) (McKinney 1968).
23. See Effective Programs 425-27. See also 1968 N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N,
ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 114-32 [hereinafter cited as 1968 SYMPOsIUM]




Law section 190.20 because they require an intent to deceive.24 In
addition, the statutes do not cover the entire range of deceptive acts
and practices confronting consumers.25
Of greater benefit to consumers are statutes which provide both
criminal and civil penalties for either the commission of specifically
prohibited activities" or for failure to comply with statutory and
other regulatory standards.27 The existence of both civil and crimi-
nal penalties in these instances gives the supervising agency flexibil-
ity in its efforts to secure compliance. While major use is made of
civil penalties, criminal proceedings are initiated where serious vio-
lations occur.2"
B. Consumer Protection Agencies
1. Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection
New York State's best known consumer protection agency is the
Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection, established in 1957 by
executive order of Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz. 9
24. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 392-b (misdemeanor for placing
certain false descriptions upon an article of merchandise or its label with
intent to deceive), 395 (misdemeanor for offering, with intent to deceive,
used, rebuilt, reconditioned or repossessed television sets, radios, phono-
graphs or major household appliances without so tagging the merchan-
dise), 533 (misdemeanor to knowingly distribute, sell or install reactivated
or second-hand radio or television tubes without clearly disclosing the
nature of the tube) (McKinney 1968).
25. See 1968 SYMPOSIUM 117.
26. A new statute declaring chain distributorship schemes to be unlaw-
ful is of this type. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-ff (McKinney Supp.
1974). Subdivision 3 of this law states that "[a] chain distributor scheme
shall constitute a security within the meaning of this article and shall be
subject to all of the provisions of this article." This includes a misde-
meanor penalty, among others, for violation of any section of the article.
Id. § 352-c (McKinney 1968).
27. A new state law requiring unit pricing in retail food stores is
N.Y. AGRIc. & MKTS. LAW § 193-h (McKinney Supp. 1974). Violation of
any section of the Agriculture and Markets Law is a misdemeanor. Id. § 41
(McKinney 1972).
28. See, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 41 (McKinney 1972); N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 358 (McKinney 1971).
29. No specific statutory mandate exists for either the creation or oper-
19751
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a. The Bureau in Operation
The Bureau's aim is to protect consumers in New York State,
consumers outside of New York State who deal with the New York
business community, and New York consumers who purchase goods
and/or services from out-of-state concerns." Staff members resolve
many problems through mediation,3' which accounts for most of the
funds recovered by the Bureau.32 Ethical businesses have proven
most cooperative in this regard. 3 Where accomodation has either
not been reached or is deemed inappropriate, formal legal proceed-
ings are initiated.34 The Bureau also publishes extensive consumer
literature and conducts various educational programs to assist the
public to avoid victimization by fraudulent dealers.33 It likewise
recommends consumer legislation, and staff members frequently
appear before various federal, state, and local government depart-
ation of the bureau. Mindell, The New York Bureau of Consumer Frauds
and Protection-A Review of Its Consumer Protection Activities, 11
N.Y.L.F. 603, 603 n.4 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as Mindell]. The
Bureau has grown to a staff of over thirty people. THE 1973 BUREAU OF
CONSUMER FRAUDS AND PROTECTION, N.Y. ST. DEP'T OF LAW ANN. REP.
[hereinafter cited as 1973 CONSUMER FRAUDS REP.]. It has recovered over
17 million dollars in money, goods, and services for consumers during its
existence. Id. at 2. The Bureau recovered some $2,465,390 for the public
as a result of mediation and court action. Id. at 4. In addition, statutory
costs assessed and turned over to the state treasury amounted to $105,374,
and Agriculture and Markets Law penalties recovered totaled $17,170. Id.
at 26.
30. 1973 CONSUMER FRAUDS REP. 5.
31. In 1973, 26,589 consumer fraud complaints were received. Id. at 26.
32. Id. The very presence of the Bureau in the dialogue promotes the
settlement of claims. The merchant's awareness that a "bad faith" refusal
to settle may result in the initiation of formal action by the Bureau, which
in turn could lead to unfavorable publicity, weights heavily in favor of
accommodation of the consumer's claim. Settlement, by contrast, is infor-
mal; no court records are published, and there is usually little or no result-
ing publicity. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of
Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 BUFFALO U.L. REv. 559, 589-90 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Rice].
33. Id. at 5.
34. See text accompanying notes 58-61 infra.
35. 1973 CONSUMER FRAUDS REP. 11.
[Vol. III
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In recent years numerous enactments of the state legislature have
increased the powers of the Attorney General to proceed against
deceptive acts and practices in the marketplace. Those statutes,
utilized primarily by the Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protec-
tion, are discussed immediately below:
i. General Business Law Section 350
Sections 350-a to 350-e of article 22-A of the General Business
Law37 were enacted in 1963 because of the conceded ineffectiveness
of the Penal Law in combatting false advertising.38 Section 350 for-
bids "[flalse advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or
commerce or in the furnishing of any service. '39 Section 350-c em-
powers the Attorney General to bring an action 0 to recover a civil
penalty of five hundred dollars for each violation. The recovery
36. Id. at 23-25.
37. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 350-a to 350-e (McKinney 1968).
38. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra. See also 1959 N.Y. ST.
B. Ass'N ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 186-199 [hereinafter cited as 1959
ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM].
39. "The term 'false advertising' means advertising, including label-
ing, which is misleading in a material respect; and in determining whether
any advertising is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among
other things) not only representations made by statement, word, design,
device, sound or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the
advertising fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representations
with respect to the commodity to which the advertising relates under the
conditions prescribed in said advertisement, or under such conditions as
are customary or usual." N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350-a (McKinney 1968).
40. Id. § 350-b provides that after receiving such notice of contem-
plated action by the Attorney General, the person receiving the notice is
given the opportunity to show either orally or in writing why the proposed
action should not be brought. Among other things, such person may show
"that the advertisement is subject to and complies with the rules and
regulations of, and the statutes administered by the Federal Trade Com-
mission or any official department, division, commission or agency of the
state of New York." Id.
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accrues to the state.4' In such actions, it is a complete defense that
the "advertisement is subject to and complies with the rules and
regulations of, and the statutes administered by the Federal Trade
Commission or any official department, division, commission or
agency of the state of New York."42 This defense evidences a legisla-
tive intent to maintain harmony with federal law and subject com-
mercial dealings to uniform standards of conduct. 3 Article 22-A
affects neither the rights of parties in private litigation44 nor the
remedies available to the Attorney General under section 63(12) of
the Executive Law.45 The article exempts from its application media
and press broadcasters and publishers or printers of advertise-
ments.46 The Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection has sel-
dom resorted to court action under these sections. Most advertisers
present their case to the Bureau before court action is commenced,
and this often results in the advertiser's entering into a voluntary
administrative consent decree known as an Assurance of Discontin-
uance.
47
Where litigation has been commenced,48 courts have held that
41. Id. § 350-c. Although a defendant is subject to a civil penalty for
"each violation," there is no statutory definition of what constitutes a
separate violation within the meaning of the article. The Attorney Gen-
eral's position is that each separate insertion of an advertisement in a
publication constitutes a separate violation. Mindell 616 n.72 (1965).
42. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350-c (McKinney 1968).
43. See Governor Rockefeller's Approval Message, N.Y. Sess. Laws
2066 (McKinney 1963). The whole body of federal case law and administra-
tive decisions thus become guides to the application of the state statute.
Id. In fact, the definition of false advertising found in N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 350-a (McKinney 1968) is in substance a reformulation of the definition
in section 15 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 55-a(1)
(1970). See Mindell 617. The Federal statute, however, does exclude label-
ing in its definition. 15 U.S.C. § 55-a(1) (1970). The intent of the state
legislature was to make the substantive standards of the Federal Act ap-
plicable to state law.
44. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350-d(1) (McKinney 1968).
45. Id. § 350-d(2).
46. Id. § 350-e.
47. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(15) (McKinney 1972) authorizes the Attorney
General to enter into these voluntary consent decrees.
48. Proceedings under the statute have been infrequent. The five
hundred dollar civil penalty is in many cases too small an amount to act
[Vol. III
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section 350 of the General Business Law adopts standards identical
to those established by the Federal Trade Commission under section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.49 "The capacity to deceive"
or the "likelihood of the deception" on the public is the criterion for
violation 0 Actual deception is not an element of the offense.5' Since
intent to deceive is not required to find a violation," the good or bad
faith of the advertiser is irrelevant. 3 Defenses such as abandonment
of the deceptive practice,54 industry-wide use of the practice in ques-
as a deterrent, and the Attorney General, prior to the enactment of N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 349 (McKinney Supp. 1974) in 1970, had to show persist-
ent fraud or illegality in order to obtain an injunction. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 63(12) (McKinney 1972). Only six successful actions were prosecuted in
the Civil Court of the City of New York under the statute from 1963 to July
1967. 1968 SYMPOSIUM 119. With the passage of N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349
(McKinney Supp. 1974) in 1970, however, the Bureau of Consumer Frauds
and Protection may now bring actions to enjoin false advertising, seek
restitution for defrauded consumers, and obtain the civil penalty under
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350-c (McKinney 1968) for a single proven incident
of false advertising.
49. State v. Colorado State College, 76 Misc. 2d 50, 53-54, 346
N.Y.S.2d 482, 486-87 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Metropolitan N.Y. Retail Mer-
chants Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 60 Misc. 2d 805, 807, 303 N.Y.S.2d 612, 614
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
50. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967).
51. Id.
52. FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963); Gimbel
Bros. v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578-79 (2d Cir. 1941).
53. Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921,
924 (6th Cir. 1968); Koch v. FTC, 206 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1953). The
civil penalty is regarded as a more appropriate remedy for false advertising
than a criminal sanction. See 1959 ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 190-92. The
fact that the action is not prosecuted by the district attorney and that the
stigma attached to a civil penalty is less than that of a criminal conviction
makes it an easier statute to enforce. But the civil penalty does have
limitations: the statute gives no relief to consumers, there is no dollar
deprivation to the seller that is measured by the injuries sustained on
account of the false advertisement, and society as a whole, rather than
individual consumers, is vindicated. Rice 584-85.
54. In Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 593 (9th Cir. 1957), the court
held that since there was no guarantee that the defendant would not begin
the deceptive practice anew, the Commission was entitled to issue a cease
and desist order after the practice had stopped.
1975]
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tion,50 uncontrollable salesmen,"6 and proof that the false advertis-
ing would not have deceived the reasonable man57 have all been
rejected by federal courts in cases involving violation of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. Section 350 should be similarly construed.
ii. Executive Law Section 63(12)
The general grant of power to the Attorney General under section
63(12) has traditionally been his most potent resource. On five days
notice, the Attorney General may seek an order enjoining "persist-
ent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or transaction
of business . . ."" "Fraud" is defined to include "any device,
scheme or artifice to defraud and any deception, misrepresentation,
concealment, suppression, false pretence, false promise or uncons-
cionable contractual provisions.""9 In addition to injunctive relief,
the Attorney General is now explicitly authorized to seek restitution
for defrauded consumers.10 Further, he is authorized to seek an
order cancelling the business certificate of any sole proprietorship
or partnership."'
55. This defense is rejected for the reason that the practice does not
cease to be unfair because others in the industry also .engage in it. Heav-
enly Creations, Inc. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 7, 8 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 955 (1965); see Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958); FTC
v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
56. The issue is whether the misrepresentation by the salesman was
made within his actual or apparent authority. Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d
584, 590 (9th Cir. 1957). But see 2A HULL, AGENCY 617 (1974); cf. F.
MEECHEM, AGENCY 106 (1967).
57. The reasonable man test has been rejected for the reason that a
consumer should not have to suspect the integrity of a businessman. FTC
v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937).
58. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1972).
59. Id.
60.. The legislature granted the Attorney General authority to seek res-
titution by amending the Executive Law in 1970. See Law of March 3,
1970, ch. 44, § 1, [1970] N.Y. Laws 104 (McKinney 1972). Numerous
authorities had recommended the enactment of such a provision. See, e.g.,
Wade & Kamenshine, Restitution for Defrauded Consumers: Making the
Remedy Effective Through Suit by Governmental Agency, 37 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 1031 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wade & Kamenshine]; Rice,
supra note 32.
61. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 130(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974) requires
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Courts have broadly construed section 63(12). In Lefkowitz v.
ITM, Inc.,62 a chain referral commission scheme 3 for the sale of
household appliances was declared an illegal lottery 4 and fraudu-
lent 5 within the meaning of this section. Purchasers of the appli-
ances paid exorbitantly high prices relying on the representation
that they would realize high commissions on the referrals they made
to the seller. Customers were told that six to seven purchases would
result for every ten referrals submitted, and they were guaranteed
three hundred dollars if they referred at least twenty names to the
company. In fact, the number of sales resulting from the referrals
was lower than represented. The court, noting the mathematical
impossibility of referring prospects beyond a certain point in the
chain of referrals, enjoined the scheme.
Though the question of what constitutes "persistent fraud or ille-
gality" has not been clearly answered, there are indications of a
flexible interpretation. In an earlier proceeding in the ITM case, the
court stated that an injunction lies "where a substantial number of
single acts of fraud form a pattern of proscribed behavior."66 In
People v. Compact Associates,"7 the court enjoined a sales scheme
persons conducting business under assumed names or as partners to "file
in the office of the clerk of each county in which such business is conducted
or transacted a certificate . .. ."
62. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
63. Chain referral sales schemes are now statutorily prohibited in New
York. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-fff (McKinney Supp. 1974).
64. 52 Misc. 2d at 57-60, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 324-28.
65' The court found fraud in the defendants' failure to inform custom-
ers that the goods were not available at lower prices elsewhere. Id. at 48,
275 N.Y.S.2d at 316. "The rule is clear that where one party to a transac-
tion has superior knowledge, or means of knowledge not open to both
parties alike, he is under a legal obligation to speak and his silence
constitutes fraud." Id. (citations omitted). In addition, the court found
that because of the excessively high prices charged the contracts were
unconscionable within the meaning of N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKin-
ney 1972) and N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (McKinney 1964). 52 Misc. 2d at 54,
275 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
66. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 155 N.Y.L.J. 17, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 28,
1966) (a previous disposition granting a temporary injunction against
ITM).
67. 22 App. Div. 2d 129, 254 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1st Dep't 1964) (per cur-
iam), aff'd mem., 17 N.Y.2d 758, 217 N.E.2d 143, 270 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1966).
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that created an "atmosphere conducive to fraud,""8 after instances
of actual fraud were proven at trial. 9 Similarly, courts have con-
strued section 63(12) to apply to all business activity accompanied
by repeated acts of illegality."0 This approach of looking to the total-
ity of the seller's scheme and its effect seems appropriate.
The section 63(12) action is a special proceeding, and the Attor-
ney General must establish his case by a fair preponderance of the
evidence.7' He is entitled to summary judgment unless substantial
issues of fact are raised by the pleadings. Where issues of fact are
raised, and the case is put down for trial, the Attorney General may
seek a temporary injunction for the duration of the proceeding. In
deciding whether to grant a temporary injunction, the court weighs
the possible injury to the public against the economic hardships to
the defendant.73
68. 22 App. Div. at 131, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
69. The defendants' practice of paying five dollars for the privilege of
demonstrating vacuum cleaners, presentation of a so-called "Bond of
Friendship," and concealment of the nature of the product intil the sales
talks started created this "atmosphere conducive to fraud." Id. at 130, 254
N.Y.S.2d at 267. This factor, plus the proof at trial of some thirty instances
of fraud (out of an estimated twenty thousand sales), were deemed to
constitute persistent fraud within the meaning of N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12)
(McKinney 1972).
70. People v. E.F.G. Baby Prods. Co., 40 App. Div. 2d 364, 368, 340
N.Y.S.2d 352, 354 (3d Dep't 1973).
71. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 401-11 (McKinney 1972) governs special proceed-
ings under N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1972).
72. See State v. Lobel, 154 N.Y.L.J. 16, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 9, 1965);
People v. Willensky, 153 N.Y.L.J. 16, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 15, 1965). The
proceeding is triable without a jury. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 410 (McKinney
1972). The Attorney General must prove fraud by a fair preponderance of
the evidence. People v. Silinsky, 217 App. Div. 247, 216 N.Y.S. 637 (2d
Dep't 1926), aff'd, 244 N.Y. 524, 155 N.E. 882 (1926); People v. Levinson,
23 Misc. 2d 483, 199 N.Y.S.2d. 265 (Sup. Ct. 1960). But see People v.
Compact Associates, 22 App. Div. 2d 129, 134, 254 N.Y.S.2d 265, 271 (1st
Dep't 1964) (dissenting opinion) (proof of fraud must be clear and convinc-
ing).
73. People v. Biochemical Procedures, Inc., 68 Misc. 2d 753, 755, 327
N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (Sup. Ct. 1971), modified, 38 App. Div. 2d 925, 329
N.Y.S.2d 878, aff'd mem., 31 N.Y.2d 792, 291 N.E.2d 293, 339 N.Y.S.2d
115 (1972); People v. Levinson, 23 Misc. 2d 483, 199 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup.
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The subpoena powers granted the Attorney General pursuant to
section 63(12) of the Executive Law74 have been upheld by courts.75
A witness subject to a nonjudicial subpoena may move to quash or
modify it"M on the ground that it calls for irrelevant or immaterial
documents or subjects the witness to harassment." To sustain the
subpoena, the Attorney General must show both the basis for the
inquisitorial action" and the reasonable relationship of the docu-
ments to the subject matter under investigation." Whether such
reasonable relationship can be shown depends upon the scope of
materials sought and the status of the investigation when the sub-
poenas are issued. 0 The showing need not amount to "probable
cause" that a violation of law will be disclosed,8" but at the same
time "no agency of government may conduct an unlimited and gen-
eral inquisition into the affairs of persons within its jurisdiction
Ct.). See Metzger Co. v. Fay, 4 App. Div. 2d 436, 439, 166 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90
(1st Dep't 1957); People v. Wickersham Women's Medical Center, 69 Misc.
2d 196, 198, 329 N.Y.S.2d 627, 630 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd 39 App. Div. 2d 1020
(1st Dep't 1972).
74. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2302(a) (McKinney 1972) authorizes the Attorney
General to issue subpoenas without a court order.
75. La Belle Creole Int'l S.A. v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 192, 176 N.E.2d
705, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1961).
76. The witness cannot make the motion, however, until the Attorney
General has first been requested to withdraw or modify it. N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 2304 (McKinney 1974).
77. Myerson v. Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage Co., 33 N.Y.2d 250,
256, 306 N.E.2d 804, 807-08, 351 N.Y.S.2d 687, 693 (1973).
78. Id. at 256, 306 N.E.2d at 807-08, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 693; A'Hearn v.
Committee on Unlawful Practice of Law, 23 N.Y.2d 916, 918, 246 N.E.2d
166, 167, 298 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (1969). In Myerson, supra, the requirement
of showing some basis for the investigation is set up to prevent administra-
tive abuses against innocent parties. 33 N.Y.2d at 260,306 N.E.2d at 810,
351 N.Y.S.2d at 696-97.
79. La Belle Creole Int'l S.A. v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 192, 196, 176
N.E.2d 705, 707, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1961); Carlisle v. Bennett, 268 N.Y.
212, 217, 197 N.E. 220, 222 (1935).
80. A'Hearn v. Committee on Unlawful Practice of Law, 23 N.Y.2d 916,
918, 246 N.E.2d 166, 167-68, 298 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316-17 (1969).
81. See Myerson v. Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage Co., 33 N.Y.2d 250,
256, 306 N.E.2d 804, 808, 351 N.Y.S.2d 687, 693 (1973).
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solely on the prospect of possible violations of law being dis-
covered." 2
The Business Corporation Law authorizes the Attorney General
to seek dissolution of domestic corporations8 3 and to enjoin foreign
corporations from doing business in New York 4 where such corpora-
tions have done business in a "persistently fraudulent or illegal
manner." 5 The action is triable by jury as of right." The Attorney
General has utilized these dissolution powers to complement his
powers under section 63(12). The courts have been liberal in deter-
mining what constitutes operating in a "persistently fraudulent or
illegal manner.""
82. A'Hearn v. Committee on Unlawful Practice of Law, 23 N.Y.2d 916,
918, 246 N.E.2d 166, 167, 298 N.Y.S.2d 315, 316 (1969). In Myerson v.
Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage Co., 33 N.Y.2d 250, 306 N.E.2d 804, 351
N.Y.S.2d 687 (1973) a "non-judicial" subpoena duces tecum was quashed
where all the books and records of defendant's company were sought in
relation to an investigation initiated after the receipt of numerous com-
paints. Because of the great scope of the subpoena, the showing to support
it was deemed insufficient and was outweighed by the "risks and possible
fact of unjustified harassment." Id. at 260, 306 N.E.2d at 810, 351
N.Y.S.2d at 696.
83. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1101(a)(2), 1303 (McKinney 1963).
84. Id. § 1303 empowers the Attorney General to enjoin or annul the
authority of any such foreign corporation which does any act within New
York which would constitute grounds for corporate dissolution if done by
a domestic corporation. Id. §§ 109(c), (d) designates the Secretary of State
for service of process for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction in a pro-
ceeding brought by the Attorney General against a foreign corporation
which, though unauthorized to do business in New York pursuant to sec-
tion 1301 of the Business Corporation Law, does any fraudulent act in New
York.
85. Id. § 1l01(a)(2). Leave of court is no longer required to bring a
dissolution action under the New York Business Corporation Law. Id. §
1101.
86. Id. § 1101(b). A receiver may be requested and appointed at any
stage of the proceedings. Id. §§ 1113, 1202. Similarly, a restraining order
may be sought at any stage in the proceedings. Id. § 109(b)(3). Subpoena
authority is granted by N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1972) and
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 109(b)(6) (McKinney 1963). The paramount con-
sideration in dissolution cases brought by the Attorney General is the
"interest of the public." Id. § 1111(b)(1).
87. See, e.g., People v. Abbott Maintenance Corp., 11 App. Div. 2d
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iii. General Business Law Section 349
In 1970 the New York Legislature amended article 22-A of the
General Business Law by adding section 349,8 which makes unlaw-
ful: "[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business,
trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state
.. . '89 The phrase "deceptive acts or practices" is identical to the
phrase used in section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act; the
intent of section 349 is "to make the federal law and its interpreta-
tion of deceptive acts and practices applicable to state enforce-
ment. 9 0 This intent is made clear by the provisions of section 349(d)
which make compliance "with the rules and regulations of, and the
statutes administered by, the federal trade commission" a complete
defense in an action brought under the statute."
136, 201 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1st Dep't 1960) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 9 N.Y.2d
810, 175 N.E.2d 341, 215 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1961) (sustaining false advertising
as grounds for corporate dissolution); State v. Remedial Educ., Inc., 70
Misc. 2d 1068, 335 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (corporation falsely prom-
ising its customers to arrange admissions to medical and dental schools);
State v. Saksnit, 69 Misc. 2d 554, 332 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (corpo-
ration selling term papers).
88. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349 (McKinney Supp. 1974). In 1970 the
legislature substituted "Consumer Protection From Deceptive Acts Prac-
tices" for "False Advertising; Civil Penalty" as a heading for N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW art. 22-A (McKinney Supp. 1974).
89. Id. § 349(a). The statute is meant to include all economic activity
concerning consumer protection. 1968 SYMPOSIUM 121. The Committee au-
thored N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349 (McKinney Supp. 1974) and its report
accompanied the bill through the legislature. See State v. Colorado State
Christian College of the Church of the Inner Power, 76 Misc. 2d 50, 53, 346
N.Y.S.2d 482, 486 (Sup. Ct. 1973). The Committee on New York Antitrust
Law rejected a proposal that the statute prohibit "unfair methods of com-
petition" in addition to "deceptive acts or practices," since it would have
made the whole body of federal antitrust law applicable in cases prose-
cuted under the statute. See 1968 SYMPOSiUM 127-29.
90. 1968 SYMPOSIUM 124.
91. "Section 349-d . . . is drawn from section 350-b of the General
Business Law. The Committee believes such a provision is necessary in
order to protect businessmen from conflicting standards . . . ." 1968
SYMPosIuM 123-24. Because of the legislative intent to establish a uniform
standard as to the meaning of "deceptive act or practice," cases construing
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Section 349(b) provides that preliminary and permanent injunc-
tive relief may be awarded when the Attorney General believes
"from evidence satisfactory to him that any person, firm, corpora-
tion or association or agent or employee thereof has engaged in or is
about to engage in any of the acts or practices stated to be unlawful
. . ,"9 Restitution of "any moneys or property obtained directly
or indirectly by any such unlawful acts or practices"9 may also be
ordered. The Attorney General need not wait for evidence of persist-
ent fraud before bringing a proceeding under the statute. This reme-
dies the major shortcoming of section 63(12) of the Executive Law
which requires a showing of persistent fraud before an injunction
will lie. 4 The injunctive remedy of section 349(b) may be invoked
section 350 of the General Business Law (false advertising) are also rele-
vant. State v. Colorado State Christian College of the Church of the Inner
Power, 76 Misc. 2d 50, 346 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1973), the leading case
interpreting section 349 of the General Business Law, agrees with the ra-
tionale for following the rulings of the Federal Trade Commission and the
federal case law with respect to the interpretation of deceptive acts and
practices outlawed in section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970). 76 Misc. 2d at 54-56, 58, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 487-89,
491.
92. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(b) (McKinney Supp. 1974). The proce-
dural requirements are contained in section 349(c). Section 349(c) requires
the Attorney General to give the person against whom proceedings are
contemplated five days notice by certified mail before bringing the action
and an opportunity to show in writing within five business days thereafter
why such proceedings should not be brought against him. Such notice may
be dispensed with where the Attorney General determines such notice
would not be in the public interest and the action brought seeks prelimi-
nary relief. Id. § 349(c). Subpoena powers are granted, id. § 349(f), and the
Attorney General is authorized "to take proof and make a determination
of the relevant facts. . . ." Id. The statute does not apply to broadcasters
or newspapers, magazines, and other publications. Id. § 349(e).
93. Id. § 349(b).
94. 1968 SYMPosIuM 121-22; see Governor's Memoranda, N.Y. Sess.
Laws 3074 (McKinney 1970). "[T]he injunction method is deemed essen-
tial in order to effectively combat fraudulent claims in areas where existing
laws are less than adequate for full consumer protection." Memoranda of
Attorney General, 1970 N.Y. ST. LEG. ANN. 92, 96; see 1968 SYMPosIuM 118
("statutes based upon persistent fraud do not provide adequate consumer
protection since they leave the public open to repeated fraud before the
remedy, by its own terms, can be invoked").
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only as to the deceptive act or practice. 5 The more drastic remedies
of business ouster and corporate dissolution still require a showing
of persistent fraud or illegality." Finally, section 349(b) authorizes
the Attorney General to seek restitution for consumers who have
been directly or indirectly victimized by the deceptive act or prac-
tice. Section 63(12) permits restitution only in cases of persistent
illegal activity.
iv. Miscellaneous Statutes
Numerous statutes empower the Attorney General to seek prelim-
inary and permanent injunctions. They include statutes prohibiting
bait advertising,97 the use of a false name or address with intent to
deceive,"8 and certain other deceptive practices." Alternatively, the
95. 1968 SYMPOSIUM 121. Violation of a court order forbidding future
violations can result in the application of sanctions by the court. Id.
96. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1101(a)(2) (McKinney 1963); N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1972). Section 349 of the General Business Law
does not appear to apply to "illegal acts" unless the act in question
amounts to a deceptive act or practice. For instance, a violation of section
350 of the General Business Law (false advertising unlawful) is a deceptive
practice. See State v. Colorado State Christian College of the Church of
the Inner Power, 76 Misc. 2d 50, 346 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1973). How-
ever, it is doubtful that a violation of N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 386 (McKinney
Supp. 1974) (requiring the tagging of articles of bedding) would be consid-
ered a deceptive act or practice. On the other hand, a strong argument can
be made that all violations of statutes enacted to protect consumers are
deceptive acts within the meaning of section 349 of the General Business
Law. The answer to this question acquires significance when restitution is
sought in an action brought under the statue and/or an injunction is sought
where the violated statute contains no such provision.
97. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 396 (McKinney 1968).
98. Id. § 133.
99. See id. § § 395(1) (sale of used, rebuilt, reconditioned or repossessed
television or radio receiving sets, phonographs, or major household appli-
ances without appropriate markings), 399-g (fraudulent acts and practices
in relation to theatrical syndications), 533 (sale of reactivated or second-
hand radio and television tubes without markings). See also id. §§ 141
(unauthorized use of the name "United Nations"), 135 (use of the name
of benevolent, humane or charitable corporations with intent to acquire
personal or business advantages, enforced by the Charities Frauds Bureau
of the Department of Law), 353 (fraudulent practices in respect to stocks,
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Attorney General may choose to proceed against these violations
pursuant to section 63(12) of the Executive Law when a persistent
illegality is involved, or under section 349 of the General Business
Law when the violation concerns consumer deception. Thus, fraud-
ulent activity may violate a variety of statutes and subject the viola-
tor to injunction, restitution, and business ouster."'0
In lieu of commencing an action, section 63(15) of the Executive
Law authorizes the Attorney General to accept an Assurance of
Discontinuance-an administrative document, drawn by the Attor-
ney General, providing that the violator will desist from the objec-
tionable act or course of conduct."0 ' The Assurance is the most com-
mon solution to cases brought before the Bureau of Consumer
bonds and other securities, enforced'by the State Antitrust Enforcement
and Compliance Section Bureau of the Department of Law).
100. See, e.g., id. § 532-37 (McKinney 1974) (Radio and television
tubes); N.Y. PEas. PROP. LAW §§ 301-15 (McKinney 1962), as amended,
(McKinney Supp. 1974) (Motor Vehicle Retail Instalment Sales Act); id.
§§ 401-22, as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1974) (Retail Instalment Sales
Act). The Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection also collects penal-
ties under the Agriculture and Markets Law. See N.Y. AGRIC. MKTS. LAW
§ 189 (false labels), § 202-a (false advertising) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
In 1973, the Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection recovered $17,170
in penalties. 1973 CONSUMER FRAUDs REP. 26.
101. The concept of the Assurance of Discontinuance finds its source
in the Cease and Desist Order issued by the Federal Trade Commission.
15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1970); see Mindell 621. There is no standard form
Assurance, as each must be tailored to the particular case. Id. Section
63(15) of the Executive Law permits inclusion in the Assurance of a stipu-
lation for voluntary payment of the costs of the investigation not exceeding
two thousand dollars per defendant. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8303(a)(6)
(McKinney Supp. 1974). A provision may also be made for the creation of
an escrow account with the Attorney General for ultimate distribution to
aggrieved consumers. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 121(2)(o) (McKinney 1974)
exempts "[t]he monies received by the department of law, intended to
be held in escrow pending the outcome of an action or proceeding, or as
restitution, in whole or in part, to persons who have filed complaints with
such department" from payment to the state treasurer. Until 1970, when
section 63(12) of the Executive Law was amended, and section 349 of the
General Business Law was enacted, the anomalous situation existed where
restitution could be obtained in assurance cases but not in an action for a
permanent injunction, business ouster, or corporate dissolution.
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Frauds. 102 In a civil action commenced by the Attorney General,
violation of an Assurance is prima facie evidence of violation of the
applicable law. °3
c. Critique
The Attorney General's injunctive and restitutionary powers are
now statutorily complete."4 The requirement of proving "persistent
fraud or illegality" for business ouster and corporate dissolution is
appropriate, considering the radical nature of those remedies.,0 5 The
use of civil penalties for deceptive acts and practices, however,
should be resurrected and molded into a substantial penalty and
deterrent. This could be done by amending section 349 of the Gen-
eral Business Law and section 63(12) of the Executive Law to pro-
vide a sliding scale of civil penalties."'
The existence of a realistic civil penalty would fill the void left
by injunctive and restitutionary relief. Restitution simply returns to
victimized consumers that which was wrongfully taken from them;
an injunction prevents the wrongdoer from continuing his deceptive
102. Mindell 603-04.
103. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63(15) (McKinney 1972). In an appropriate
case, however, the Attorney General may agree to the inclusion in the
assurance of an exculpatory clause indicating that the violator enters into
the agreement without admitting violation of the law and for settlement
purposes only. Mindell 621.
104. The Attorney General must of course follow the letter of the stat-
utes. See State v. Alexanders Dep't Stores, Inc., 42 App. Div. 2d 532, 344
N.Y.S.2d 719 (1st Dep't 1973) (affirming dismissal of action brought by.
Attorney General under section 249 of the General Business Law where the
notice provisions thereof were not satisfied and the act complained of
occurred seven months previous to the commencement of the action).
105. Rice 595 n.3.
106. The scaled penalties can take one of two forms. The penalty im-
posed upon conviction may be an amount no less than a stated minimum
nor more than a stated maximum. See, e.g., N.Y. AGmc. & MKTS. LAW §
41 (McKinney 1972) (violation subjects the violator to a fine of not less
than twenty-five nor more than two hundred dollars). Alternatively, an
amendment may provide for a civil penalty up to a stated maximum. See,
e.g., id. § 201-d (providing for a fine of not more than five hundred dollars).
The first of these two alternatives is more favorable, as it would provide
flexibility and, in addition, have greater effect as a deterrent than would
the latter alternative, because of the existence of a minimum penalty.
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practice. Unless realistic monetary penalties are imposed, an un-
scrupulous dealer may conclude that the risk is worthwhile consid-
ering the possibility of non-discovery and the likelihood that he will
not lose any of his own property even if he is discovered.' 7
As a practical matter, most cases must be handled by Assurances
of Discontinuance. Section 63(15) of the Executive Law should be
amended to permit inclusion in the Assurance of a stipulation pro-
viding for the payment of a civil penalty when the Assurance admits
a violation.
The Bureau of Consumer Frauds is hampered by the budgetary
problems which plague many government agencies.'"' Although the
Bureau has considerable depth of personnel in its New York City
office, there is significantly less strength in the other six district
offices of the Department of Law. The result is that the Bureau has
inadequate resources to protect the consumer statewide.' 0 This has
led to the creation of a number of local consumer protection offices
with which the Bureau cooperates." 0
107. Exceptions to this statement are the small and ineffective civil
penalty for false advertising, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350-c (McKinney
1968), and the possible loss of goodwill, a factor that the wrongdoer may
consider worth the risk.
108. The executive budget for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1974
submitted by Governor Rockefeller provided $3,226,000 for the protection
of consumers and investors, which funds all of the following Department
of Law Bureaus: the Consumer Frauds and Protection Bureau; the Anti-
Monopolies Bureau; the State Antitrust Enforcement and Compliance
Section; the Building, Home Improvement & Miscellaneous Frauds Bu-
reau; the Charity Frauds Bureau; the Securities and Public Financing
Bureau, and the Education Bureau.
109. In 1973, Auburn reported receiving 86 consumer cases and effected
recovery of $1,542.64. 1973 DEP'T. OF LAW ANN. REP. 75. Buffalo reported
1,627 complaints and the recovery of $85,925.43. Id. at 77. Plattsburgh did
not report the number of complaints received or any effected recovery. Id.
at 79. Rochester reported 931 formal complaints and recovered approxi-
mately $20,998.76. Id. at 83. Syracuse reported recovering $181,243 for
consumers but did not specify the number of complaints received. Id. at
85. The district office in Albany did not report on its activities.
110. The Bureau is a member of the Regional Consumer Council, a
coordinating group which facilitates communication among some forty
consumer-related agencies in the New York metropolitan area. 1974 N.Y.
REGIONAL COUNCIL REP., app. A.
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2. Other Bureaus Involved in Consumer Protection
Two other bureaus within the Attorney General's Office have lim-
ited jurisdiction over deceptive practices. The Building, Home Im-
provement and Miscellaneous Frauds Bureau .(Building Bureau),
established in 1971,"' is principally concerned with fraudulent prac-
tices in the construction of swimming pools and home improve-
ments."' Although the majority of its cases are informally settled
through mediation,"' the Building Bureau may utilize the powers
of the Attorney General."'
The Charity Frauds Bureau is charged with protecting consumers
from fraudulent sales under the guise of charity."' Such a sale in-
volves a misrepresentation that profits will go to a charity.", Injunc-
tive relief"7 and Assurances of Discontinuance"' are the primary
weapons of this bureau."'
111. 1971 DEP'T OF LAW ANN. REP. 3.
112. Id. at 3; see N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 369-g (McKinney Supp. 1974).
The Charity Frauds Bureau had jurisdiction over these activities prior to
the creation of this Bureau. 1971 DEP'T OF LAW ANN. REP. 5.
113. In 1973, some 3,581 matters were concluded through informal
mediation, while only 14 matters involved either court proceedings or as-
surances of discontinuance. 1973 REPORT OF THE DEP'T OF LAW 7. In 1973
the Bureau recovered $586,172.62 for consumers. Id.
114. See State v. Parker, 30 N.Y.2d 964, 287 N.E.2d 618, 335 N.Y.S.2d
827 (1972) (standing denied under section 63(12) of the Executive Law);
State v. Parkchester Apts. Co., 28 N.Y.2d 842, 270 N.E.2d 920, 322
N.Y.S.2d 74 (1971).
115. 1973 REPORT OF THE DEP'T OF LAW 11. The Bureau has other func-
tions. See id.
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id. See also People v. Signarino, 171 N.Y.L.J. 2, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.
Feb. 21, 1974). In that case the court, under section 63(12) of the Executive
Law, enjoined the defendants from selling advertising space to the business
community in various booklets entitled "Drug Prevention Program," from
conducting business in a fraudulent and deceptive manner, and soliciting
funds for alleged charitable causes. The donors and advertisers believed
defendants' "Drug Prevention Program" was a charitable organization
when in fact it was carried on for profit. Restitution was also granted and
the business certificate was annulled. See also 1972 DEP'T OF LAW ANN.
REP. 7.
118. 1972 DEP'T OF LAW ANN. REP. 7.
119. In 1972 the Charity Frauds Bureau handled over 10,000 items,
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C. State Consumer Protection Board
The Consumer Protection Board (Board) was created by the legis-
lature"' in 1970 to ensure coordination of the numerous consumer
programs of various state agencies,' and to perform other
consumer-related tasks.'22 Its members are the chairman of the pub-
lic service commission,'23 the superintendents of banking and in-
surance, the Secretary of State, and the commissioners of agricul-
ture and markets, environmental conservation, and commerce and
health. Its executive director,'24 who is appointed by the governor,2 5
administers the Board and is empowered to make recommendations
to the governor relating to consumer problems, and otherwise "en-
courage the protection of the legitimate interests of consumers
within the state."'2 8 As directed by the Board, he may acquire other
listed powers and duties, which include conducting investigations
and assisting consumers in class actions.' 7
recovered $13,850 in costs and $1,699 as restitution for the public. Id. at 8.
120. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 550 (McKinney 1972).
121. See Governor's Annual Message to the Legislature, N.Y. Sess.
Laws 3037, 3048 (McKinney 1970).
122. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 553 (McKinney 1972) enumerates the powers
and duties of the board and the executive director.
123. Several recent amendments to the Public Service Law give the
Consumer Protection Board some influence in that field. See N.Y. PUB.
SERV. LAW §§ 24(a)(1) (requiring notice by the Public Service Commission
or a directed utility to the Consumer Protection Board prior to any rate
increase), 71 (requiring the Public Service Commission to investigate writ-
ten complaints by the Consumer Protection Board); 84 (requiring an inves-
tigation by the Public Service Commission upon a complaint, in writing,
by the Consumer Protection Board, as to the. service and price of steam
heat), 96(3) (authorizing the State Consumer Protection Board to make
complaints, in writing, concerning acts done or omitted by a telegraph or
telephone corporation alleged to be in violation of the terms of its franchise
or charter, or any order of the Commission) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
124. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 550 (McKinney 1972).
125. "[W]ith the advice and consent of the senate .... Id. § 551.
126. Id. § 553(2)(b).
127. These powers and duties are enumerated in N.Y. EXEC. LAW §
553(3) (McKinney 1972) and include the power to "a. conduct investiga-
tions, research, studies and analyses of matters affecting the interests of
consumers; b. cooperate with and assist the attorney general in the carry-
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The Board promotes legislation,"" publicizes available govern-
ment services,' 9 coordinates intergovernmental surveys,' 0 advises
local governments on establishing consumer offices, 3 ' undertakes a
variety of consumer education activities,'32 and performs numerous
other functions. 33 Although it is without subpoena and enforcement
powers, it is authorized to refer complaints to the appropriate gov-
ernment agency.' 3' The Board also compiles 135 monthly complaint
reports showing total number of complaints, types of complaints,
number of complaints resolved, and amounts recovered or saved by
state consumer protection agencies.' 3 Patterns of deception are thus
ing out of his legal enforcement responsibilities for the protection of con-
sumers;, c. cooperate with and assist consumers in class actions in proper
cases; d. represent the interests of consumers of the state before federal,
state and local administrative and regulatory agencies; e. study the opera-
tion of consumer protection laws and recommend to the governor new laws
and amendments of laws for consumer protection; f. conduct product re-
search and testing and, where appropriate, contract with private agencies
and firms for the performance of such services; g. initiate and encourage
consumer education programs; h. cooperate with and assist local govern-
ments in the development of consumer protection activities; i. establish
advisory councils to assist in policy formulation on specific consumer prob-
lems; and j. undertake activities to encourage business and industry to
maintain high standards of honesty, fair business practices, and public
responsibility in the production, promotion and sale of consumer goods and
services."
128. 1973 STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION BD. ANN. REP. 5-9.
129. Id. at 10.
130. In 1973 the Board coordinated a state-wide survey of hazardous
toys as part of a national program. Id.
131. Id. at 11.
132. Id. at 18-19.
133. The Board is New York State's liason with the new United States
Consumer Product Safety Council. Id. at 11. In addition, the Board served
on a number of advisory and planning committees. Id. at 12.
134. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 553(2)(a) (McKinney 1972).
135. During the first nine months of 1971 the Board handled more than
7,500 complaints, with the resultant refunding of approximately $40,000
for consumers. 1971 DEP'T OF LAW ANN. REP. 2.
136. Id. at 17. This information is pooled with the complaint data of
all the members of the Regional Consumer Protection Council. See note
163 infra.
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more easily discovered by the appropriate agency. '
III. Jurisdiction By Local Consumer Offices Over Deceptive
Practices
The failure of the state to cope adequately with the full range of
consumer deceptions has led to the creation of local consumer pro-
tection offices.'38 These offices are of two types: those that are educa-
tional, investigatory, and referral; and those that also possess broad
enforcement powers.
A. Educational and Referral Offices
The first local consumer offices to make their appearance were
educational and referral offices.'39 The enacting statutes provide
broad investigatory, research, educational, and coordinating powers
similar to the New York State Consumer Protection Board.'40 Like
the Board, these local offices have no enforcement powers, and upon
discovery of a deceptive practice they must either conclude the
matter informally or refer it to a proper forum.'4 ' However, unlike
the Board, the director or head of the local office often has authority
to conduct hearings, compel the attendance of witnesses, administer
oaths, take testimony under oath, and compel the production of
137. 1973 STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION BD. ANN. REP. 17.
138. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i)(McKinney 1969) permits all
local governments "to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with
the provisions of the constitution or not inconsistent with any general law
relating to its property, affairs, or government . . . ." Id. § 10(1)(ii)(a)
(11) permits local governments to enact local laws for the protection,
order, conduct, safety, health, and well-being of persons or property
therein even when the laws do not relate to the property, affairs or govern-
ment of such municipality. See also N.Y. GEN. CrrY LAW § 20(23) (Mc-
Kinney 1968) (authorizing cities to enact local ordinances); N.Y. TOWN
LAW § 130(15) (McKinney 1965) (authorizing the enactment of town
ordinances promoting the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the
community.
139. See, e.g., NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.0
(Supp. 1973)(enacted June 9, 1967); NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 64
(1972)(enacted Sept. 10, 1968).
140. See note 127 supra.
141. Compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 553(3)(a)-(j) (McKinney 1972) with
NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 21-10.0 (Supp. 1973).
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evidence.'42 Furthermore, he is typically authorized' to receive and
investigate complaints, initiate his own investigations, represent
142. See, e.g., Orange County, N.Y., Ordinance 5, § 18.06(A), Sept. 25,
1970; Long Beach, N.Y., Ordinance 1, Mar. 3, 1970; Ramapo, N.Y., Ordi-
nance 1, § 4(a), Mar. 22, 1972. See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2302(a) (McKin-
ney 1974). Not all of these laws enable the director of consumer protection
to conduct investigations into all kinds of deceptive practices. Yonkers,
N.Y., Ordinance 2, §§ 2(b)-(c) Jan. 12, 1971, limits the consumer protec-
tion officer's power to conduct investigations to matters involving weights
and measures and existing statutes relating to the advertising, labeling,
packaging, and offering for sale and the sale of all commodities, goods,
wares, and services. The director is often authorized to perform or super-
vise the duties of the sealer of weights and measures under the Agriculture
and Markets Law. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAw § 182 (McKinney 1972)
(counties); id. § 183 (McKinney Supp. 1974) (cities). Alternatively, some
of the laws extend the powers of the sealer by making him the director of
consumer protection. See, e.g., Mount Vernon, N.Y., Ordinance 8, art. X-
B, § 126-(c)(6), Nov. 23, 1971 (superintendent of weights and measures
designated the coordinator of consumer protection); Schenectady, N.Y.,
Ordinance 4, § 33-1, June 1, 1971 (sealer of weights and measures desig-
nated the chief administrator of the Bureau of Weights and Measures and
Consumer Protection). In either situation the new consumer office is bene-
fited in that it begins its life with a staff core already familiar with numer-
ous consumer problems. Where the new powers of the consumer protection
office are not supplemented with new personnel, existing workloads may
prevent their effective utilization.143. See, e.g., Orange County, N.Y., Ordinance 5, § 18.06A, Sept. 25,
1970; Long Beach, N.Y., Ordinance 1, § 29, Mar. 3, 1970; Yonkers, N.Y.,
Ordinance 2, § 2, Jan. 12, 1971. But see Erie County, N.Y., Ordinance 20,
§§ 1630, 1632 (1973) (specifically placing all statutory powers in the Con-
sumer Protection Committee). Several local ordinances empower already
existing administrative officers to perform the enumerated tasks of the
office of consumer protection. See Rockland County, N.Y., Ordinance 5,
§9 1-2, Oct. 19, 1970 (making the sealer of weights and measures the
coordinator of consumer protection); Schenectady, N.Y., Ordinance 4, §
33-1, June 1, 1971 (powers are lodged in the Bureau of Weights and Mea-
sures and Consumer Protection, through the sealer of weights and mea-
sures). Differences in the statutory wording in the aforementioned statutes
appear insubstantial except in the case of the Erie County law, which gives
the Consumer Protection Committee substantially more power in the run-
ning of the office than do the other statutes. See Erie County, N.Y., Ordi-
nance 20, § 1630 (1973).
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the interests of consumers before administrative committees, refer
complaints, prepare educational material, and deal with numerous
other matters relating to consumer affairs.'"
There is usually an advisory committee to assist the director.'
Its members'46 are appointed'47 for specific terms'48 and generally
represent a cross-section of business and consumer interests.'49
B. Offices With Enforcement Powers
Unfair trade practices laws, which grant potent enforcement pow-
ers to a number of local consumer offices, 5° grew out of the laws that
144. See ordinances cited in notes 142-43 supra. A practical limitation
on the exercise of these powers is that the appropriation for such offices
is usually small.
145. Where the powers of the consumer offices are placed in a consumer
protection committee, its chairman cannot act on most matters without
committee authorization. See, e.g., Erie County, N.Y., Ordinance 20, §
1630 (1973); Ramapo, N.Y., Ordinance 1, § 3, March 22, 1972.
146. The committees vary in membership. See, e.g., Erie County,
N.Y., Ordinance 20, art. 16B, § 1632 (1973) (nineteen members); Rockland
County, N.Y., Ordinance 5, § 4, Oct. 19, 1970 (nine members); Mount
Vernon, N.Y., Ordinance 8, art. X-B, § 126(d), Nov. 23, 1971 (five mem-
bers); Yonkers, N.Y., Ordinance 2, § 3, Jan. 12, 1971 (thirteen members).
147. On the county level, members are appointed by the County Exec-
utive. See, e.g., Erie County, N.Y., Ordinance 20, art. 16B, § 1632 (1973).
On the city level they are appointed by the mayor. See, e.g., Mount Ver-
non, N.Y., Ordinance 8, art. X-B, § 126-d, Nov. 23, 1971. On the town level
they are appointed by the town board. See, e.g., Ramapo, N.Y., Ordinance
1, § 3, Mar. 22, 1972.
148. See, e.g., Rockland County, N.Y., Ordinance 5, § 4, Oct. 19, 1970,
which reads in pertinent part: "Of the nine members first appointed, three
(3) shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years, three (3) for a term of
two (2) years and three(3) for a term of one (1) year; thereafter, all appoint-
ments shall be for a term of three (3) years."
149. See, e.g., Yonkers, N.Y., Ordinance 2, § 1, Jan. 12, 1971; Rockland
County, N.Y., Ordinance 5, § 4, Oct. 19, 1970; Orange County, N.Y.,
Ordinance 5, § 1806B, Sept. 25, 1970. Members serve without compensa-
tion except for reimbursements for expenses incurred in the performance
of committee duties. See, e.g., Yonkers, N.Y., Ordinance 2, § 1, Jan. 12,
1971; Rockland County, N.Y., Ordinance 5, § 4, Oct. 19, 1970; Orange
County, N.Y., Ordinance 5, § 1806B, Sept. 25, 1970.
150. This type of legislation, which has the effect of setting up a power-
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created the referral-type office,' 51 and are a marked improvement in
concept and practice. "Deceptive or unconscionable trade
practice[s]" are made unlawful,"' and rulemaking'53 and enforce-
ment powers' 4 are granted to a Commissioner of Consumer Af-
fairs. 55
1. Statutory Analysis' 6
The rulemaking and enforcement provisions in unfair trade prac-
tices laws supplement the powers and duties granted to the agency
under the less comprehensive consumer protection laws.' 7 Advisory
ful administrative agency, has been enacted by several local governments.
See Onondaga County, N.Y., Ordinance 2, (1973); Suffolk County, N.Y.,
Ordinance 22, Sept. 11, 1973. These laws, with some variations, contain
the same provisions as NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-
10.2 (Supp. 1974).
151. The first comprehensive consumer protection law enacted at the
local level was the New York City Consumer Protection Law of 1969. NEW
YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, 88 2203d-1.0 to -8.0 (Supp.
1974). Similarly, Nassau County enacted its own comprehensive section in
1970. NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.2 (Supp. 1974).
152. See, e.g., NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.2(1)
(Supp. 1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-
1.0 (Supp. 1974).
153. See NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.2 (Supp.
1974) (requiring the commissioner to hold a public hearing upon at leat
seven days public notice before adopting rules and regulations effectuating
the purposes of the section, including regulations defining specific decep-
tive or unconscionable trade practices); NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-3.0 (Supp. 1974).
154. See NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.2(4) (Supp.
1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-4.0
(Supp. 1974).
155. These comprehensive consumer protection laws generally place
the enumerated statutory powers in a commissioner of consumer affairs,
and not a committee on consumer protection. See NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y.,
ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.2(3)-(5) (Supp. 1974).
156. For a discussion of the New York City Consumer Protection Law
of 1969, see Morgan, New York City Consumer Protection Law of 1969, 4
J.L. REFORM 244 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Morgan]; Comment, New
York City's Alternative To The Consumer Class Action: The Government
as Robin Hood, 9 HARV. J. LEGIS. 301 (1972).
157. See, e.g., NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.0
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committees, 5 ' which exist in most localities with consumer protec-
tion laws, '5 have no administrative responsibilities under the more
comprehensive statutes.
a. Statutory Prohibitions
"Deceptive" practices typically include any representations that
have the "capacity, tendency or effect of deceiving or misleading
consumers."'' 0 The standard for violation is the same as under sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and article 22-A of the
General Business Law. An intent to deceive is not necessary to
establish a violation; nor is it necessary to show actual injury.'0 The
(Supp. 1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A (Supp.
1974); Suffolk County, N.Y., Ordinance 21, tit. A (Supp. 1974).
158. See notes 145-49 supra and accompanying text.
159. See NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.0 (Supp.
1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, § 2204 (Supp. 1974);
SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., CHARTER, art. XXXII, § 3203. See also Onondaga
County, N.Y., Ordinance 2 (1973) (creating an Office of Consumer Affairs
with enforcement powers, with no provision for an advisory committee on
consumer affairs). However, the town of Huntington, which has estab-
lished the only comprehensive consumer protection ordinance at the town
level in the state, Huntington, N.Y., Ordinance 8, ch. 27, § 27-1(b), Oct.
19, 1971, has located rule making and enforcement powers in a nine mem-
ber consumer protection board. See Huntington, N.Y., Ordinance 2, Feb.
1, 1972, amending Ordinance 8, ch. 27, §§ 27-5(1), (2), Oct. 19, 1971.
160. See, e.g., NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-
10.2(2)(b) (Supp. 1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit.
A, § 2203d-2.0(a) (Supp. 1974). In the following textual discussion of the
statutory provisions in these laws, the Nassau County and New York City
laws will be primarily relied upon. Huntington, N.Y., Ordinance 8, Oct.
19, 1971 is similar in most respects to the New York City Consumer Protec-
tion Law of 1969. Suffolk County, N.Y., Ordinance 21, Sept. 9, 1973 is
similar to the Nassau County law. Onondaga County, N.Y., Ordinance 2
(1973) contains provisions found in both the New York City and Nassau
County acts, as well as several unique provisions. For instance, in
Onondaga County, the Unfair Trade Practices Law is promulgated in the
form of a code of rules and regulations by the county legislature. Onondaga
County, N.Y., Ordinance 2, Res. 1, (1973). Rules and regulations under the
Code of Consumer Protection are promulgated by the county legislature,
and not by the director of consumer affairs. Id.
161. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, §
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laws often label certain specific practices deceptive,162 but state that
the enumeration is not exclusive.6 3 This open-endedness makes the
laws a potent weapon against unscrupulous merchants." 4
An "unconscionable" practice has been defined as "any . . .
practice . . . which unfairly takes advantage of the lack of knowl-
edge, ability, experience or capacity of a consumer,"' 65 or which
results in a gross disparity between the value received by a con-
sumer and the price paid by him.'66 This definition of "unconscion-
ability" may be broader than the same term in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code,6 7 which does not disturb the "allocation of risks"
because of superior bargaining position. 8' The unfair trade prac-
2203d-4.0(e) (Supp. 1974). The Nassau County law does not contain this
provision, though it probably does not evidence a contrary legislative in-
tent in light of the definition of "deceptive" practices.
162. See, e.g., NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.2(b)
(Supp. 1974) (listing eleven deceptive practices); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-4.0(e)(Supp. 1974) (listing nine specifi-
cally proscribed deceptive practices).
163. See, e.g., NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.2(b)
(Supp. 1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A. § 2203d-
2.0 (Supp. 1974).
164. Morgan 254. It has even been suggested that the broad definition
of deceptive trade practices prohibits ordinary puffing and exaggeration.
Id. at 253. Compare NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, §
2203d-4.0(e) (Supp. 1974) with N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (McKinney 1964)
("an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting
to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not
create a warranty").
165. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-2.0
(b) (Supp. 1974); accord, NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-
10.2(2)(c) (Supp. 1974).
166. The Nassau and Onondaga County laws provide that a resulting
"gross disparity in the rights of a consumer as against the merchant" is
also unconscionable. NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-
10.2(2)(c) (Supp. 1974); Onondaga County, N.Y., Ordinance 2, Res. 1, §
1(C), (1973).
167. See Morgan 255-56.
168. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1 (McKinney 1964). Comment 1
states that "[tihe principle is one of the prevention of oppression and
unfair surprise and not disturbance of allocation of risks because of supe-
rior bargaining power."
19751
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
tices laws may lessen the bargaining power of merchants by declar-
ing unconscionable any practice which takes unfair advantage of the
consumer's inferior position.'89
The Nassau County law'70 permits the Commissioner to proceed
against all unconscionable trade practices. The New York City ordi-
nance, however, requires that before a practice may be deemed
unconscionable, it must be so described with reasonable particular-
ity in a local law or in a rule or regulation issued by the Commis-
sioner of Consumer Affairs.' 7 ' No unconscionable practices are de-
lineated in the New York City ordinance, but guidelines for the
issuance of rules and regulations are set forth.' Though the guide-
169. See Morgan 255. On the other hand, risks in consumer transac-
tions are generally determined by legislation. See, e.g., N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 2-
312 to -18 (McKinney 1964). It may be that any advantages unfairly taken
by a merchant cause the oppression of consumers, a condition that Uni-
form Commercial Code section 2-302 was intended to remedy. See Jeffer-
son Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct.
1969) (where automobile buyer with little knowledge of the English lan-
guage unknowingly waived warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose on a defective automobile the contract was held unen-
forceable); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264
(Sup. Ct. 1969) (freezer with actual value of $300, sold for $900 ($1439.69
including credit charges), unlawful as a matter of law).
170. NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-20.2(4) (Supp.
1974); Onondaga County, N.Y., Ordinance 2, Res. 1, § § 2, 4 (1973); Suffolk
County, N.Y., Ordinance 22, § 4, Sept. 9, 1973.
171. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-2.0(b)
(Supp. 1974). A similar provision is contained in Huntington, N.Y., Ordi-
nance 8, ch. 27, § 27-2(B), Oct. 19, 1971.
172. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-2.0(b)
(Supp. 1974) states: "In promulgating such rules and regulations the com-
missioner shall consider among other factors: (1) knowledge by merchants
engaging in the act or practice of the inability of consumers to receive
properly anticipated benefits from the goods or services involved; (2) gross
disparity between the price of goods or services and their value measured
by the price at which similar goods or services are readily obtained by other
consumers; (3) the fact that the acts or practices may enable merchants
to take advantage of the inability of consumers reasonably to protect their
interests by reason of physical or mental infirmities, illiteracy or inability
to understand the language of the agreement, ignorance or lack of educa-
tion, or similar factors; (4) the degree to which terms of the transaction
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lines are broad, courts have sustained regulations issued under
them. 73
b. Rules and Regulations
All of the comprehensive consumer protection laws provide for the
issuance of rules and regulations.' In most instances the Commis-
sioner of Consumer Affairs promulgates these rules,'75 but the power
may be lodged elsewhere.' The New York City ordinance expressly
provides that rules and regulations "may supplement but shall not
be inconsistent with . . . decisions of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and the Federal courts in interpreting the provisions of Section
require consumers to waive legal rights; (5) the degree to which terms of
the transaction require consumers to jeopardize money or property beyond
the money or property immediately at issue in the transaction; and (6)
definitions of unconscionability in statutes, regulations rulings and deci-
sions of legislative, or judicial bodies in this state or elsewhere."
173. In Commercial Lawyers Conference v. Grant, 65 Misc. 2d 897, 318
N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1971) the court rejected plaintiff's claims that a
regulation declaring it an unconscionable practice for a creditor, its agents
or employees, or collection agencies to communicate or threaten to com-
municate with the debtor's employer prior to obtaining a final judgment
against a debtor was violative of plaintiff's right to due process and free
speech. National Ass'n of Installment Co. v. Grant, 37 App. Div. 2d 955,
326 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1st Dep't 1971) upheld both the constitutionality of the
New York City Consumer Protection Law of 1969, and a particular regula-
tion issued thereunder.
174. NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, §21-10.2(3) (Supp.
(1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch.64, tit. A, §2203(d)-3.0
(Supp. 1974); Onondaga County, N.Y., Ordinance 2, § 4(A) (1973); Suffolk
County, N.Y., Ordinance 22, §3, Sept. 9,1973; Town of Huntington, N.Y.,
Ordinance 8, §27-3, Oct. 19, 1971.
175. NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.2(3) (Supp.
1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-3.0
(Supp. 1974); Suffolk County, N.Y., Ordinance 22, § 3, Sept. 9, 1973.
Under the Nassau and Suffolk laws, the commissioner must hold a public
hearing upon seven business days notice before issuing any rule or regula-
tion. A hearing is not so required under the New York City law.
176. Huntington, N.Y., Ordinance 8, § 3, Oct. 19, 1971 authorizes the
consumer protection board to submit to the town board proposed rules and
regulations. Onondaga County, N.Y., Ordinance 2, § 1 (1973), leaves the
power to issue rules and regulations exclusively in the county legislature.
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5 (a)(1), or the Federal Trade Commission Act ... or the decisions
of the courts interpreting General Business Law § 350 and the Uni-
form Commercial Code § 2-302."'' ' This indicates the legislative
intent to establish a uniform standard defining "deceptive and un-
conscionable trade practices." The Nassau County law' 8 does not
contain such a provision, but it would seem wise for courts to read
it into the statute, especially since state law has adopted the federal
standard.'79 The advantage of rulemaking is that it provides a means
of declaring a deceptive or unconscionable practice unlawful almost
as soon as merchants devise it.' s°
c. Enforcement Provisions
The local laws provide both formal and informal procedures for
dealing with violations. Informal procedures are fairly uniform. In
lieu of initiating formal proceedings against a violator, the Commis-
sioner of Consumer Affairs ' can accept an "Assurance of Dis-
177. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch 64, tit. A, § 2203d-3.0
(Supp. 1974). A similar proviso is contained in Huntington, N.Y., Ordi-
nance 8, § 27-3, Oct. 19, 1973. NEW YoR, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64,
tit. A, § 2203d-7.0 (Supp. 1974) states that the provisions of the New York
City law shall supplement, but not be inconsistent with, the rules,
regulations, and decisions of the Federal Trade Commission.
178. The Suffolk and Onondaga County Laws are also without such a
proviso.
179. See text accompanying notes 90-91 supra.
180. Morgan 257. However, the rule or regulation must be authorized
by the legislation, or it will be struck down by the courts. See New York
State Merchant's Ass'n v. Grant, 63 Misc. 2d 550, 312 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup.
Ct. 1970). In that case a regulation promulgated by New York City's Com-
missioner of Consumer Affairs requiring unit pricing in food stores was
permanently enjoined on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the
court finding that the regulation involved the assertion of legislative power
not granted by statute. See Picone v. Commissioner of Licenses, 241 N.Y.
157, 162, 149 N.E. 336, 338 (1925). The unit pricing regulation enjoined in
New York State Merchants Ass'n v. Grant, supra, was later enacted into
law by the City Council. See NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64,
tit. B, § B64-1.0-5.0 (Supp. 1974).
181. See also Onondaga County, N.Y., Ordinance 2 (1973) (Director of




continuance,"' 82 which need not include the admission of any
wrongful act.' 83 It may include a stipulation for restitution to con-
sumers and payment by the violator of the costs of the investiga-
tion.'8 4 The New York City'85 and Town of Huntington laws' 88 permit
a stipulation for restitution in the Assurance; a consumer accepting
such restitution is thereafter barred from recovering further dam-
ages. There is no corresponding provision for restitution in the Nas-
sau, Suffolk, or Onondaga County laws.'8 Formal enforcement is
accomplished by court proceedings against violators 8 of the con-
sumer protection law. 89 All local laws contain civil penalty provi-
182. See, e.g., NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.2
(5)(a) (Supp. 1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A,
§ 2203d-5.0(a) (Supp. 1974).
183. See, e.g., NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-
10.2(5)(b) (Supp. 1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit.
A, § 2203-5.0(a) (Supp. 1974); Suffolk County, N.Y., Ordinance.22, § 5(b),
Sept. 11, 1973. Onondaga County, N.Y., Ordinance 2, § 5 (1973) is silent
as to whether entering into an assurance is an admission of a violation or
not. Violation of an assurance is treated as a substantive violation and is
subject to the formal penalties provided. NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE tit. D, § 21-10.2(5)(b) (Supp. 1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203-5.0(b)(Supp. 1974); Huntington, N.Y., Ordi-
nance 8, § 27-6(B), Oct. 19, 1971; Suffolk County, N.Y., Ordinance 22, §
5(c), Sept. 9, 1973.
184. See, e.g., NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-
10.2(5)(a) (Supp. 1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit.
A, § 2203d-5.0(a) (Supp. 1974).
185. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203-5.0(a)
(Supp. 1974).
186. Huntington, N.Y., Ordinance 8, § 27-6, Oct. 19, 1971.
187. No such provision exists in N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(15) (McKinney
1972). Where such provisions do not exist there appears to be no bar to a
recovery of further damages.
188. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64 tit. A, §2203d-6.0
(Supp. 1974) and NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, §21-10.2(6)
(Supp. 1974) exclude television and radio broadcasting stations, publishers
and printers of newspapers, magazines or other forms of printed advertis-
ing who broadcast, publish or print the deceptive advertising of a mer-
chant.
189. NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-20.2(4)(a) (Supp.
1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-4.0(a)
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sions.9 0 The New York City ordinance provides a higher civil pen-
alty or criminal fine for knowing violations. 9' Localities may also
seek temporary injunctive relief, restraining orders, and other equi-
table relief. The Nassau and Suffolk County laws require "repeated,
persistent or multiple violations,""'9 while New York City, the Town
of Huntington, and Onondaga County laws permit application for
relief after a single violation. 3 The latter laws are more sound con-
ceptually; there is no reason why a deceptive or unconscionable
course of conduct must be permitted to continue until it can be
called "persistent."
The New York City,'94 Town of Huntington,'95 and Onondaga
County laws' 8 allow each locality to maintain a restitution action
(Supp. 1974). The locality's legal department brings the court action at the
request of the local department of consumer affairs. See Morgan 260 n.74.
190. The amount of the civil penalty varies. The New York City law
provides for a civil penalty of from fifty to three hundred and fifty dollars.
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-4.0 (Supp.
1974). The Town of Huntington provides for a sliding scale of from fifty to
five hundred dollars. Huntington, N.Y., Ordinance 8, § 27-4(B), Oct. 19,
1971. NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.2(4)(a) (Supp.
1974) provides a civil penalty of not more than five hundred dollars for
each violation, as does Suffolk County, N.Y., Ordinance 22, § 4(a), Sept.
9, 1973. Onondaga County, N.Y., Ordinance 2, §§ 5(A), (B) (1973) provides
for a civil penalty of not more than one thousand dollars for a particular
course of conduct violative of the local law or administrative rules and
regulations, thus avoiding the technical question of what constitutes a
single violation.
191. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-4.0(b)
(Supp. 1974) provides for a civil penalty of five hundred dollars or a fine
of five hundred dollars, or both, on proof of a knowing violation of the
Consumer Protection Law. Huntington, N.Y., Ordinance 8, § 27-4(C), Oct.
19, 1971 contains the same provision.
192. NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.2(4)(b) (Supp.
1974); Suffolk County, N.Y., Ordinance 22, § 4(b), Sept. 9, 1973.
193. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-4.0 (d)
(Supp. 1974). Similar language is found in Onondaga County, N.Y., Res.
1, § 4(C) (1973) and Huntington, N.Y., Ordinance 8, § 27-4(E), Oct. 9,
1971.
194. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-4.0(c)
(Supp. 1974).
195. Huntington, N.Y., Ordinance 8, § 27-4(D), Oct. 19, 1971.
196. Onondaga County, N.Y., Ordinance 2, Res. 1, § 4(A) (1973).
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against a violator upon a finding by the consumer director of "re-
peated, multiple or persistent violation" of the law, rules or regula-
tions. 97 All property recovered in the restitution action must be paid
into an account.'98 Where consumer claims exceed the recovery paid
into the account, awards to multiple consumers are prorated accord-
ing to the value of each claim proved.'99 Most importantly, where
the consumer chooses to share in the proceeds of a restitution action,
he forfeits his right to institute a private action."°
2. The Unfair Trade Practices Laws in Operation
In practice, local consumer offices with enforcement powers re-
solve most complaints 0' without litigation.202 Advising local busi-
197. The Nassau and Suffolk County laws do not contain any provision
permitting a suit to be brought for restitution. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-4.0(c) (Supp. 1974), and Huntington,
N.Y., Ordinance 8, § 27-4 (D), Oct. 19, 1971, require that written notice
be given the defendant of the proposed action, and that he have the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate in writing within five days that no repeated, multi-
ple or persistent violations have taken place.
198. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2601 (McKinney Supp. 1974). The consumer
protection office is entitled to recover the costs of investigation from the
violator. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203-4.0(c)
(Supp. 1974); Onondaga County, N.Y., Ordinance 2, Res. 1, § 4(b) (1973);
Huntington, N.Y., Ordinance 8, § 27-4(D), Oct. 19, 1971. The New York
City and Huntington laws provide that the costs of the investigation may
be deducted from the amount recovered for consumers if it cannot be
recovered from the defendant. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64,
tit. A, § 2203d-4.0(c) (Supp. 1974); Huntington, N.Y., Ordinance 8, § 27-
4(D), Oct. 19, 1971. The same result can be inferred from section 4(B) of
the Onondaga Consumer Protection Code. See Onondaga County, N.Y.,
Ordinance 2, Res. 1, § 4(B) (1973).
199. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A. § 2203d-4.0(c)
(Supp. 1974); Huntington, N.Y., Ordinance 8, § 27-4(D), Oct. 19, 1971.
200. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-4.0(c)
(Supp. 1974); Huntington, N.Y., Ordinance 8, §27-4(D), Oct. 19,1971. No
such foreclosure is effected under Onondaga County, N.Y., Ordinance 2,
Res. 1, § 4(A) (1973). The possibility of multiple recovery also exists under
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1972) and N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349
(McKinney Supp. 1974).
201. In 1973 Nassau County received 14,186 complaints against ven-
dors. 1973 NASSAU COUNTY OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS ANN. REP. 6
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ness concerns of the various provisions of the local unfair trade
practices law often results in their immediate discontinuance. °3
Where the vendor ignores written requests or his alleged actions
are flagrant or a pattern of deceptive acts has developed, the vendor
may be requested to appear at the local consumer office for a confer-
ence.'"4 He is then orally informed of the complaints and the provi-
sions and penalties of the unfair trade practices law.205 Vendors
may simply be asked to end the deceptive practice and to make
restitution to consumers.20 In more serious cases, assurances of dis-
continuance may be executed.0 7 In most cases, complaints against
vendors are resolved during these conferences." 8
Another method of resolving cases involves administrative hear-
ings. 109 At these hearings the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs
takes evidence. 10 If he determines that the vendor has committed a
deceptive practice, he generally accepts an Assurance of Dis-
continuance"' in lieu of instituting formal legal proceedings.21 The
Assurance often contains provisions for restitution to consumers and
the payment of costs and fines. 13
[hereinafter cited as 1973 NASSAU COUNTY REP.]. Onondaga County re-
ceived 856 complaints during that same year. 1973 ONONDAGA COUNTY OF-
FICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS ANN. REP. attachment 1 [hereinafter cited as
1973 ONONDAGA COUNTY REP.].
202. See 1973 NASSAU COUNTY REP. 3-4; 1973 ONONDAGA COUNTY REP.
1. Restitution and other remedial action is generally accomplished through
the exchange of letters and telephone calls. 1973 NASSAU COUNTY REP. 3.
203. 1973 ONONDAGA COUNTY REP. 1.
204. The Nassau County Office held 217 of these "vendor conferences"
in 1973. 1973 NASSAU COUNTY REP. 4.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.2(5)(a)
(Supp. 1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203-
5.0(a) (Supp. 1974).
208. 1973 NASSAU COUNTY REP. 4.
209. See, e.g., NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21.10.0 (a)
(Supp. 1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 64, § 2203(e) (Supp. 1974).
210. See 1973 NASSAU COUNTY REP. 4.
211. Id.
212. Id. 3-4.
213. See, e.g., NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. D, § 21-10.2(5)
(Supp. 1974); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. A, § 2203d-
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Local unfair trade practices laws enable local governments to
obtain services for consumers and return money to them21 1 with
minimal expense." 5 Legal proceedings are few;211 informal resolution
of consumer disputes are more typical.' Such laws have also had a
deterrent effect.2 18
All county governments should consider passing unfair trade
practices laws. Where consumer offices have not yet been estab-
lished, the more basic consumer legislation creating and empower-
ing the consumer protection agency ' can be passed simultaneously
with the unfair trade practices law.22° Such laws at the county level
would improve consumer protection statewide without great ex-
pense. 2'
IV. Jurisdiction Over Deceptive Practices By Regulatory
Agencies
A. State Level
A variety of state regulatory agencies have the responsibility to
5.0 (Supp. 1974). In 1973 the Nassau County Office of Consumer Affairs
collected $19,555 in cost fines for violations of the Unfair Trade Practices
Law. 1973 NASSAU COUNTY REP. 4.
214. See note 213 supra.
215. The 1973 budget for the Nassau County Office of Consumer Af-
fairs was $376,000. 1973 ONONDAGA COUNTY CONSUMER REP. 1. The 1973
budget for the Onondaga County Office was $44,385. Id. The New York
City Department of Consumer Affairs' authorized budget for fiscal year
1973-74 was $5,591,771. NEW YORK, N.Y., EXPENSE BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR 1973-1974, at 68.
216. The only reported cases under local unfair trade practices laws
have been brought by or against the City of New York. See, e.g., Commer-
cial Lawyers v. Grant, 65 Misc. 2d 897, 318 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1971);
Meyerson v. Phillips Televisions, Inc., 170 N.Y.L.J. 2, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. May
13, 1971).
217. See 1973 ONONDAGA CONSUMER REP. 1.
218. These local consumer offices place emphasis on eliminating unfair
business practices. See 1973 NASSAU COUNTY REP.; 1973 ONONDAGA REP. 1.
Many others have doubtless been dissuaded from unfair practices because
of the penalties imposed and the possibility of public exposure. Id.
219. See notes 120-37 supra and accompanying text.
220. See Onondaga County, N.Y., Ordinance 2 (1973); Suffolk County,
N.Y., Ordinances 21-22, Sept. 9, 1973.
221. See note 215 supra.
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enforce consumer protection laws.222 The Department of Agriculture
and Markets supervises the food and drug laws,223 while the Banking
Department has jurisdiction over credit institutions.224 The Depart-
ment of State, through its Division of Licenses, handles a broad
range of occupational and professional licensing.225 Standards of
conduct within the regulated field are set by legislation22 and regu-
lations promulgated by the authorized administrative board or offi-
cial.227 Violation of these laws and regulations can result in the im-
position of criminal22 and civil penalties,229 including suspension or
revocation of one's license.230 Thus, when an unfair practice is dis-
covered in a regulated field, the leverage often exists to persuade the
violator to rectify the wrong done to the consumer. 23'
Specific statutes prohibit unfair methods of competition and un-
222. See Rice 596.
223. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 5, 16(22), (23), (25), (27) (McKinney
1972); id. § 16(24), 16(25a) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
224. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 340 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
225. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 70, 432 (McKinney 1968). For a list
of licensing functions of the Division of Licensing Services within the De-
partment of State, see 1973 N.Y. LEG. MANUAL 607-09.
226. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 340-65 (McKinney 1971).
227. See, e.g., id. § 14 (granting the banking board rule making author-
ity over credit institutions). See also N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 18
(McKinney 1972) (granting commissioner of agriculture and markets rule-
making authority with regard to food and drug laws).
228. See, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 40 (penalty of not more
than two hundred dollars for a first offense and not more than four hundred
dollars for each succeeding violation of a rule or regulation), 202-d (McKin-
ney 1972).
229. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6809 (McKinney 1972), as amended, (Supp.
1974).
230. See, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 147-b, 251-e (McKinney
1972); N.Y. BANKING LAW §8 40, 348, 362 (McKinney 1971).
231. An example will illustrate how this process can work. A Zambian
woman complained to the State Consumer Protection Board that she had
had difficulty in obtaining an apartment in New York City, and that a real
estate agency would neither refund a $1,035 deposit she had made nor
provide her with an apartment. The Board referred the case to the Depart-
ment of State's real estate licensing section, and soon thereafter the
woman obtained both the refund and a new apartment. 1973 N.Y. ST.
CONSUMER PROTECTION BD. ANN. REP. 13-14.
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fair or deceptive acts and practices in the insurance industry.232 The
Superintendent of Insurance is authorized to issue cease and desist
orders against such acts,233 impose civil penalties,234 and obtain tem-
porary injunctions." 5 The Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets
is authorized to prevent false advertising and mislabeling in the sale
of food to the public.236 The Commissioner of the State Board of
Pharmacy is similarly authorized with regard to the sale of drugs,
devices, and cosmetics.237 These officials may also impose monetary
penalties,23 seize misbranded or deceptively advertised products,239
and obtain injunctions against continuing violations. 4 ° In addition,
the violation of many such false advertising and mislabeling stat-
utes is a misdemeanor.24'
B. Local Level
At the local level, licensing is the primary, though not the exclu-
sive, means of regulation.' These local laws regulate specific fields
232. N.Y. INS. LAW § 272 (McKinney 1966). "[Uinfair methods of
competition" include violation of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.20 (McKinney
Supp. 1974) (false advertising), among other statutes. N.Y. PENAL LAW §
273 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
233. N.Y. INS. LAW § 276 (McKinney 1966).
234. Id. § 280. Civil penalties up to five thousand dollars may be im-
posed for violation of the cease and desist order. Id.
235. Id. § 278(2).
236. N.Y. AGRIc. & MKTS. LAW §§ 199-a, 201(1), 202-a (McKinney
1972).
237. N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 6804, 6809, 6813, 6818, 6821 (McKinney 1972);
id. §§ 6808-a, 6810, 6815, 6817, 6826 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
238. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 39 (McKinney 1972); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 6809 (McKinney 1972).
239. N.Y. AGRIc. & MKTS. LAW § 202-b (McKinney 1972); N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 6813 (McKinney 1972).
240. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 202-c (McKinney 1972); N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 6824 (McKinney 1972).
241. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 41 (McKinney 1972); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 6811 (McKinney Supp. 1974). The primary means of enforcement, how-
ever, is administrative regulation. In 1973, The Consumer Frauds and
Protection Bureau of the Attorney General's Office recovered $17,170 in
Agriculture and Market penalties, and received 401 matters from that
department for further proceedings. 1973 CONSUMER FRAUDS ANN. REP. 26.
242. See Truth-in-Pricing Law, NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN CODE ANN. ch.
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and activities; however, these laws do not cover "unfair trade prac-
tices" in those localities that have an unfair trade practices law."'
1. Regulation in New York City
The New York City Department of Consumer Affairs, created by
the New York City Council in 1968,44 is responsible for enforcing
"all laws relating to the advertising and offering for sale and the sale
of all commodities, goods, wares and services." '45 That legislation
gave the Department the powers and personnel of two pre-existing
city agencies-the Department of Markets" ' and the Department of
Licenses. 47 The Markets Division of the Department of Consumer
Affairs protects consumers from theft resulting from short weights
and measures, 48 and supervises all public markets.249 It also licenses
64, tit. B, art. 1, §§ B64-1.0 to -5.0 (Supp. 1974).
243. See New York Food Merchants' Ass'n v. Grant, 63 Misc. 2d 550,
312 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct. 1970), granting plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment in an action to enjoin enforcement of a "unit pricing law" pro-
mulgated by the New York City Commissioner of Consumer Affairs pur-
suant to rule making power granted in New York City's Consumer Protec-
tion Law of 1969. The court found that the Commissioner's power to pro-
mulgate rules and regulations implementing that law's prohibition of de-
ceptive or unconscionable trade practices did not authorize the Com-
missioner to promulgate what amounted to a law requiring unit pricing in
retail grocery stores. This decision led directly to the enactment of the
Truth-in-Pricing Law, which authorizes the Commissioner of Consumer
Affairs to issue implementing rules and regulations. See NEW YORK, N.Y.,
ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 64, tit. B, art. 1, §§ B64-1.0 to -5.0 (Supp. 1974).
244. NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 64 (1972).
245. Id. § 2203(d).
246. Id. § § 2203(b) (Commissioner of Consumer Affairs shall enforce all
laws in relation to weights and measures), (f) (Commissioner shall exercise
the powers of a Commissioner of Public Markets under the Agriculture and
Markets law with respect to open air markets); see NEW YORK, N.Y.,
ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 36 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1974) (Department
of Markets).
247. NEw YORK, N.Y., CHARTER ch. 64, § 2203(c); see NEW YORK, N.Y.,
ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 32 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1974) (Department
of Licenses).
248. Violation of NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 36, tit. A, §§
833-5.0, 833-16.0 (1970) subjects the offender to a fine of not less than
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a number of occupations"' and regulates other specified activities.2"
The Commissioner of Consumer Affairs is authorized to adopt and
amend such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out his
powers and duties under the Markets Law. 52 Violation of these rules
and regulations subjects the offender to criminal penalties.253
A new article of the New York City Markets Law gives the Com-
missioner regulatory and enforcement powers with regard to the
labeling of perishable foods. "' Specifically, it empowers the Com-
twenty-five and no more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding ten days or both. Id. § 833-23.0; see City of New York v.
Alkanna, 148 N.Y.L.J. 17, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 7, 1962) (penalty for viola-
tion of section 833-16.0 recoverable only before a magistrate).
249. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 36, tit. A, §§ 833-3.0, 833-
6.0 (1970). See generally T. SMITH, 1966 GUIDE TO THE MUNICIPAL GovERN-
MENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 137-38 (9th ed. 1966).
250. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 36, tit. B, art.
4, §§ B36-22.0 to -77.0 (1970) (solid fuel dealers); id. art. 6, §§ B36-92.0 to
-98.0 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1974) (peddlers).
251. See, e.g., id. art. 7, §§ B36-99.0 to -102.0 (1970) (hamburgers and
chopped meat); id. art. 10, §§ B36-113.0 to -114.0 (1970) (sale of prepack-
aged meats).
252. Id. § 833-3.1(a). In Jackel v. Pacetta, 35 Misc. 2d 358, 229
N.Y.S.2d 57 (Sup. Ct. 1962), the court held that a regulation requiring the
grinding of meats in a place open to the public was authorized by a law
empowering the commissioner to enforce laws concerning weights and
measures.
253. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 36, tit. A, § 833-3.1(c)
(1970). Each violation carries a fine of not less than twenty-five nor more
than two hundred fifty dollars, imprisonment not exceeding ten days, or
both.
254. Id. tit. B, art. 12, §§ B36-120.1 to -120.5 (Supp. 1974). The City
Council expressed its intent to provide "a mandatory system of clear and
legible dating accompanied by a statement of recommended conditions of
storage" with respect to perishable foods. Id. § B36-120.1. The Commis-
sioner of Consumer Affairs is authorized to promulgate regulations desig-
nating those perishable foods which must be stamped or labeled as such,
and which must indicate recommended conditions and methods of storage,
as well as a clearly specified date after which the food cannot be sold for
human consumption. Id. §§ B36-120.2, B36-120.3(a). The Commissioner
also has authorization to issue any other regulation he deems necessary to
carry out the purposes of the Act, id. § B36-120.3(b), to initiate his
own investigations, take appropriate action with regard thereto, including
1975]
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missioner to require an honest and disclosure-oriented course of
conduct by manufacturers with regard to perishable foods. 55
The License Division of the Department of Consumer Affairs
plays an increasingly important role in the protection of consumers
in New York City. The Commissioner has two sources of power over
licensed occupations and activities-the License Enforcement Law
of 1973,256 and the various provisions of each licensing article.257 The
Enforcement Law broadly declares that licensing25 is "a necessary
stop-sale and stop-removal orders, id. § B36-120.4(a), and "determine the
reasonableness of any statement or representation as to the date and condi-
tions of storage" after reasonable notice and hearing. Id. § B36-120.4(b).
Provision is made for the imposition of civil penalties of not less than
twenty-five nor more than two hundred fifty dollars for each violation, and
criminal fines with the same range as the civil penalties where there is a
violation of any section of the article or regulation promulgated thereun-
der. Id. § B36-120.5. The old Bureau of Weights and Measures could only
attempt to persuade manufacturers to make only honest claims on their
labels. T. SMITH, 1960 GUIDE TO THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK 138 (3d ed. 1960).
255. The article "recognizes consumer concern with the freshness of
foods including, but not limited to, meat, poultry, fish, dairy products,
eggs, fruit, vegetables and baked goods." NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
ANN. ch. 36, tit. B, § B36-120.1 (Supp. 1974). In 1960 the Division, then
the Department of Licenses, issued licenses for seventy-nine different
license classifications. T. SMITH, 1960 GUIDE, supra note 254, at 221. In 1966
there were ninety different classifications. T. SMITH, 1966 GUIDE, supra
note 249, at 135. By 1974 that figure increased to over one hundred ten.
This information was derived from an untitled document issued by the
New York Department of Consumer Affairs. A copy is on file in the office
of the Fordham Urban Law Journal. Over 73,000 licenses are issued by the
division to individual licensees in trades ranging from home improvement
contractors, NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 32, tit. B, art. 42,
§ B32-352.0 (1970), to cabarets, id. art. 38, § B32-297.0, and process
servers. Id. art. 43, § B32-450.0 (Supp. 1974).
256. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 32, tit. A, §§ 773-1.0 to
-15.0 (Supp. 1974).
257. See, e.g., id. tit. B, art. 42, § B32-356.0 (1970) (requiring that
persons in the home improvement business obtain a license, and subjecting
all such persons to the article's provisions and regulations promulgated
thereunder).
258. "License" is defined as "an authorization by the department of
consumer affairs to carry on various activities within its jurisdiction, which
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and proper mode of regulation with respect to certain trades, busi-
nesses and industries," '259 for the protection of the public from
"deceptive, unfair and unconscionable practices, for the mainte-
nance of standards of integrity, honesty and fair dealing among
persons and organizations engaging in licensed activities, for the
protection of the health and safety of the people of New York City
and for other purposes requisite to promoting the general welfare
.. I"60 The law bestows upon the Commissioner "cognizance
and control of the granting, issuance, transferring, renewal, denial,
revocation, suspension and cancellation of all licenses issued" under
him. '6 In addition, the law authorizes him to "promulgate, amend
and rescind regulations and rules" as he thinks necessary and ap-
propriate "to carry out the powers and duties of the department;" '
"to prevent and remedy fraud, misrepresentation, deceit and un-
conscionable dealing, and to promote fair trade practices by those
engaging in licensed activities.""2 3 He may likewise require licensees
to disclose adequately the terms and conditions of performance of
the licensed activities, "the true names or corporate names of the
licensees, and. . . applicable local, state and federal laws pertinent
to consumers' interests" in the licensed activities.6 ' He is also em-
powered to require licensees to keep such records as he deems neces-
sary or useful to effectuate the purposes of the License Enforcement
Law, to retain such records for a period of three years, " and to
ensure that all licensees have made appropriate financial disclo-
sure."' The License Enforcement Law also authorizes the Commis-
may take the form of a license, permit, registration, certification or such
other form as is designated under law, regulation or rule." Id. tit. A, § 773-
2.0(c) (Supp. 1974).
259. Id. § 773-1.0.
260. Id. The City Council noted that the "commissioner. . . requires
powers, remedies, and sanctions which are equitable, flexible and effi-
cient." Id.
261. Id. 773-4.0(a).
262. Id. § 773-4.0(b)(1).
263. Id. § 773-4.0(b)(2).
264. Id. § 773-4.0(b)(3).
265. Unless otherwise specifically provided for by a provision in the
article. Id. § 773-4.0(b)(4).
266. Id. § 773-4.0(b)(5).
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sioner 6t "to protect the health, safety, convenience and welfare of
the general public" with regard to licensed activity;268 and "to en-
sure that those engaging in licensed activities do not discriminate
against any person on the basis of age, sex, race, color, national
origin, creed or religion in violation of city, state or federal laws.""6 9
The City Council intends that the broad rulemaking powers of the
Commissioner be liberally construed.27 They empower him not only
to establish standards of conduct for a licensed activity, but also to
establish remedial procedures for victimized consumers. 7' The
Commissioner is also authorized to:
conduct investigations, to issue subpoenas, to receive evidence, to hear com-
plaints regarding activities for which a license is or may be required, to take
depositions on due notice, to serve interrogatories, to hold public and private
hearings upon due notice, to take testimony and to promulgate, amend and
modify procedures and practices governing such proceedings."'
The Commissioner can conduct any investigation and hold any pub-
lic or private hearing if it relates to his licensing power or the pub-
lic's interest therein. 73
Under chapter 32 of the License Enforcement Law, 74 the Com-
missioner is authorized to suspend, revoke, or cancel any license
issued by him upon due notice and hearing. Violation of chapter 32
subjects the licensee to fines. The Commissioner27 is authorized to
suspend a license pending payment of an imposed fine or "pending
compliance with any other lawful order of the department. '276 A
failure to appear at a hearing after due notice is given is punishable
by fine or suspension or both.2 7  Failure to return a license to the
department after receipt of an order of suspension constitutes
grounds for fine or revocation of the license.27 1 Most importantly for
267. Id. § 773-4.0(b)(4).
268. Id. § 773-4.0(b)(6).
269. Id. § 773-4.0(b)(7).
270. Id. § 773-3.0.
271. Id. § 773-4.0(b)(2).
272. Id. § 773-4.0(d).
273. Id.
274. Id. §§ 773-1.0 to -15.0 (Department of Licenses).
275. This applies to the Commissioner or his designee. Id.





consumers, the Commissioner may arrange for redress of injuries 7'
in the form of a stipulation agreed to by the violating licensee."8 ' The
Commissioner's leverage is significant and a licensee, fearful of re-
vocation, suspension, cancellation or even fines, will usually come
to terms when confronted. 8' The consumer is also benefited by a
provision which requires a licensee which has committed repeated,
multiple, or persistent violations of chapter 32 to display in its
places of business and in advertisements a notice describing its
record of violations.2 8 2
Generally, civil2 8 3 and criminal penalties24 are available for chap-
ter 32 violations. A sliding scale of criminal penalties exists for
persons operating a licensed activity without a license. 2 5 The pen-
279. Id. The Commissioner may also provide for compliance with the
provisions and purposes of the various chapter 32 licensing articles, and
the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. Id.
280. The stipulation provides for restitution for the victimized con-
sumer or consumers. Id.
281. The Commissioner's authority pursuant to section 773-4.0(b) of
the New York City Administrative Code is of great significance, because
he can promulgate rules and regulations for the various articles requiring
licensing of specified activities. In addition, these articles often provide
that violation of any of their provisions or rules or regulations thereunder
constitutes grounds for revocation, suspension, or fine. See, e.g., id. art. 2,
§§ B32-243.0 (advertising by employment agencies), B32-260.0 (garbage
and parking lots), B32-332.0 (sightseeing buses and drivers), B32-357.0(8)
(home improvement business).
282. Id. tit. A, § 773-4.0(f). The form, content, and size of the notice
is specified by the Commissioner. Id. The Commissioner may require such
display for not less than ten days nor more than one hundred days on each
occasion such display is required. Id.
283. Id. § 773-5.0(a) (one hundred dollars for each violation to be re-
covered in a civil action).
284. Id. (fine of not less than twenty-five nor more than five hundred
dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding fifteen days, or both).
285. Id. § 773-5.0(b)(1). When an unlicensed violator has" never before
held a license for the licensed activity, he is subject to a fine of not less
than twenty-five dollars, nor more than five hundred dollars, or imprison-
ment not exceeding fifteen days, or both, and to a civil penalty of the
greater of twice the applicable license fee or one hundred dollars. Id.
If an unlicensed violator has never before held a license for the activity
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alty increases with the degree of the defendant's fault. Managers
and proprietors of unlicensed businesses, as well as those who lease
premises to unlicensed businesses, are subjected to a penalty during
the period the unlicensed business operates.2 Finally, the City's
legal department is authorized to seek an injunction to restrain or
enjoin any violation of chapter 32.287
The Commissioner's powers under the Licensing Enforcement
Law are supplemented by separate provisions under individual li-
censing articles. Each article"' requires the licensing of a specific
activity. Typically, the Commissioner is granted the power to deter-
mine the terms and conditions of issuing a license,8 ' the only stan-
dard being reasonableness.20 Many articles require that a bond be
but has been convicted once previously of engaging in such activity with-
out a license, or if he had held such a license but it had lapsed prior
to his perfecting an application for renewal, the minimum and maximum
fines are one hundred dollars and one thousand dollars respectively, the
maximum period of imprisonment is thirty days, and the civil penalty
recoverable in a civil action is one thousand dollars. Id. § 773-5.0(b)(2). If
the unlicensed violator has had his license revoked or suspended, or if 1e
has twice previously been convicted of engaging in the licensed activity
without a license, he is subjected to a fine of not less than two hundred
nor more than two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding
sixty days, or both; the civil penalty recoverable in such cases is two
thousand dollars. Id. § 773-5.0(b)(3).
286. Id. § 773-5.0(c) (one hundred dollars per day each day during
which the unlicensed business operates).
287. Id. § 773-5.0(d).
288. Id. tit. B, arts. 1-44.
289. See, e.g., id. art. 2, § B32-25.0 (commissioner to pass on the loca-
tion of a motion picture theatre and the character of the applicant before
granting a license to the theatre operator).
290. See In re Goodman, 112 N.Y.L.J. 507 (Sup. Ct. 1944); In re Ansre-
lan, 102 N.Y.L.J. 1880 (Sup. Ct. 1939). But see City of New York v.
S & H Book Shop, Inc., 41 App. Div. 2d 637, 341 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1st Dep't
1973), which reversed a temporary injunction enjoining petitioners from
operating a place of public amusement which exhibited motion pictures by
means of coin-operated machines. Declaring such film showing to be
within the ambit of first amendment freedoms, the court noted that the
Commissioner's grant of power under NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN.
ch. 32, tit. B, art. 1, appeared to vest, on its face, "unbridled discretion in
the Commissioner to define and determine the standards for granting a
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furnished to the city as a condition to obtaining a license. 9' Other
statutory conditions may include fingerprinting, 9 ' proof of good
character, '93 and requirements relating to the propriety and safety
of licensed premises.9 4 Once the license is obtained, the licensee
must obey all statutory requirements and rules and regulations pro-
mulgated by the Commissioner. '95 Some articles provide that a vio-
lation is punishable by fines, suspension, revocation, denial of reap-
plication of a license, '96 or imprisonment.9 '
license." 41 App. Div. 2d at 637, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 293. Questioning but not
reaching the issue of the statute's constitutionality, the court found only
that a clear right to the drastic remedy of temporary injunction was not
shown by respondent. Id., 341 N.Y.S.2d at 293. See also NEW YORK, N.Y.,
ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 32, tit. B, art. 44, § B32-474.0 (Supp. 1974), which
requires a hearing before a license may be denied to television, radio, audio
equipment, and phonograph servicemen and repairmen.
291. The Commissioner is authorized to require a bond for any licensed
activity, the amount to be fixed by him after a public hearing, except as
specifically provided in the licensing articles. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE ANN. tit. A, § 773-14.0 (Supp. 1974). The bond may be furnished
either in a specific penal sum, id. tit. B, art. 16, § B32-103.0 (1970), or in
a sum to be fixed by the commissioner. Id. art. 1, § B32-10.0.
292. See id. art. 39, § B32-311.0(c) (operators of coffee houses).
293. See, e.g., id. art. 42, § B32-355.0(6) (good character required for
home improvement contractors); id. art. 44, § B32-468.0 (television, radio
and audio equipment, phonograph servicemen and repairmen).
294. See, e.g., id. art. 39, § B32-311.0(2)(3) (coffee houses).
295. The Commissioner is authorized to promulgate rules and regula-
tions for all licensing articles by the Licensing Enforcement Act of 1973,
as well as by certain articles of chapter 32. Compare, e.g., id. tit. A, § 773-
4.0(b)(1), with id. tit. B, art. 42, § B32-356. (authorizing the Commis-
sioner to promulgate rules and regulations consistent with the provisions
of article 42, dealing with home improvement contractors).
296. See, e.g., id., tit. B, art. 42, § B32-357.0 (1970), which provides
penalties of fines, suspension, revocation, and denial of a reapplication for
violation of seven specific prohibitions and a catchall provision prohibiting
violation of any provision of article 42 or rule or regulation promulgated
thereunder.
297. Id. § B32-360.0 makes false or fraudulent representations in the
home improvement business a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding one year or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.
Many provisions of articles have been repealed with the enactment of the
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The Commissioner of Consumer Affairs has enormous leverage
over a licensed businessman engaged in any fraudulent or uncons-
cionable practices. Moreover, the number of occupations requiring
a license is growing. 98 For example, in recent years the City Council
has required the licensing of the home improvement business,2" and
process servers.3
0
2. Other Local Government Regulatory Agencies
A number of other local governments have followed New York
City in centralizing their departments of consumer affairs. Some
local laws have consolidated formerly separate administrative divi-
sions. Others have created new offices of consumer protection.3 1
The role of licensing is also expanding. Home solicitation sales are
regulated in many localities by "hawking and peddling" ordi-
nances. 302 These laws require, with some stated exceptions, 303 the
Licensing Enforcement Act. See id. tit. A, §§ 773-1.0 to -15.0 (Supp.
1974).
298. See note 256 supra and accompanying text.
299. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 32, tit. B, art. 42, § B32-
352.0(a)(1970).
300. Id. art. 43, § B32-450.0 (Supp. 1974). In his study, Professor David
Caplovitz found that ninety-seven percent of judgments in consumer credit
cases resulted from defaults, in many instances the direct result of "sewer
service." D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 161 (1963). The New York
State legislature has not yet enacted legislation that would license or other-
wise regulate process servers.
301. See, e.g., Buffalo, N.Y., Ordinance 1, §104(a), June 27, 1969 (abol-
ishing the division of markets and creating in the division of licenses a
bureau of weights and measures).
302. See, e.g., East Greenbush, N.Y., Ordinance 2, Nov. 8, 1971; Ham-
burg, N.Y., Ordinance 28, Dec. 9, 1968; Pound Ridge, N.Y., Ordinance 2,
§ 2, Feb. 13, 1969; Tomkins County, N.Y., Ordinance 5, § 2, Dec. 8, 1969.
303. See, e.g., East Greenbush, N.Y., Ordinance 2, § 11, Nov. 8, 1971:
"Nothing in this local law shall be held to apply to any sales conducted
pursuant to statute or by order of any court; to any person selling personal
property at wholesale to dealers in such articles; to merchants having an
established place of business within the town, or to their employees, or to
the peddling of meats, fish, fruit and similar produce by farmers and
persons who produce such commodities; or to dealers in milk, baked goods,
heating oil and daily newspapers; or to any licensed real estate brokers, or
to any honorably discharged member of the United States Armed Forces
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licensing of all "persons" ' 4 involved in the hawking, peddling or
soliciting of goods or wares from door to door or in a public place or
street.30 They further provide that the license applicant furnish
extensive information under oath to establish his good character.306
At least one locality has enacted licensing legislation regulating
certain other trades and businesses,0 7 such as home improvement
contracting 08 and disposal of waste oils. 30 9 In some localities, licens-
ing boards exist for tradesmen such as plumbers310 and electri-
cians.3 1 ' These boards operate to determine the fitness of applicants
and to revoke a license if it is determined that a licensee is unfit or
incapable of proper performance. 2 The existence of a licensing re-
quirement reduces the occurrence of consumer deceptions; few li-
of the United States who has procured a license under article four of the
General Business Law of the State of New York; or to persons soliciting or
collecting for any bona fide organization."
304. "Person" is defined to include "any individual, firm, partnership,
corporation, unincorporated association, and all other entities of any kind,
any principal or agent thereof." East Greenbush, N.Y., Ordinance 2, §
2(d), Nov. 8, 1971.
305. The term "hawker and peddler" is broadly defined to include all
persons who sell, barter, or offer to sell or barter goods or wares in a public
place, street or highway, from door to door or from business place to busi-
ness place. See id. § 2(a). "Solicitor" is similarly defined, but he is one who
takes or offers to take orders for goods, wares, or merchandise, or for serv-
ices to be performed in the future, or for making, manufacturing or repair-
ing any article or thing whatsoever for future delivery. Id. § 2(b).
306. See, e.g., Pound Ridge, N.Y., Ordinance 2, §§ 4-5, Feb. 13, 1969.
307. NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 21, tit. D-1, art. 1, §§ 21-
11.0 to -11.14 (Supp. 1974). The provisions of the law are similar to those
of NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 32, tit. B, art. 42, §§ B32-35.0
to -367.0 (1970).
308. NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 21, tit. D-1, art. 1, §§ 21-
11.0 to -11.14 (Supp. 1974).
309. Id., tit. G, §§ 21-70.0 to -70.8.
310. See, e.g., Greenburg, N.Y., Ordinance 4, Apr. 22, 1969.
311. See, e.g., Suffolk County, N.Y., Ordinance 17, Nov. 8, 1971,
amended by Ordinance 27, Dec. 26, 1972, and Ordinance 21, § 2, Sept. 11,
1973 (creating licensing boards for plumbers and electricians under the
jurisdiction of the county Commissioner of Consumer Affairs). Id.
312. See Suffolk County, N.Y., Ordinance 17, § 7(I), Nov. 8, 1971;
Greenburg, N.Y., Ordinance 4, § 41-7, Apr. 22, 1969.
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censed practitioners want to risk penalties which include the possi-
ble revocation of their license. 313
V. Conclusion
The effectiveness of consumer protection within New York de-
pends in large measure on the existence, powers, and activities of
government agencies on the state and local levels. Comprehensive
and practical legislation must empower these agencies not only to
take action with regard to existing deceptive acts or practices, but
also to dissuade potential violators from entering into such prac-
tices. To the greatest extent possible, administration of the various
state laws should be centralized to ensure maximum efficiency and
expertise in dealing with consumer deceptions. Where this is unfeas-
ible, administration by the various agencies must be coordinated to
avoid duplication of effort and guarantee uniform enforcement of
the law. Communication and cooperation among consumer agencies
on all levels must exist on a permanent basis.
Because of the great variety of consumer protection laws at the
state level, administration is lodged in different departments. 3" The
State Consumer Protection Board performs the task of coordinating
the activities of these governmental agencies, 35 and its powers allow
it to prevent duplication of effort among state departments. 36 The
Board also facilitates consumer protection by publicizing the exist-
ing consumer protection structure. "
At the local level, centralization of consumer protection activities
in a single agency is more practicable. The legal and equitable reme-
dies for deceptive practices are broad. The role of the civil penalty,
however, should be increased significantly. Where such a penalty is
non-existent, as in the case of a violation of section 349 of the Gen-
eral Business Law, it should be provided. Where civil penalties are
provided, as in section 350(c) of the General Business Law, the
313. The Suffolk County law authorizes the board of the licensed busi-
ness or trade to formulate and recommend a code of rules governing the
licensed occupation to the county legislature for adoption. Suffolk County,
N.Y., Ordinance 17, § 7(H), Nov. 8, 1971.
314. See text accompanying notes 29, 111-20 supra.
315. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
316. See note 127 supra.
317. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
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amount of the penalty should be increased. A higher penalty should
be imposed where there is proof of a knowing violation. Where an
Assurance of Discontinuance admits a violation, a stipulation im-
posing a civil penalty in a sum agreed upon by the parties should
be permitted. The imposition of such penalties would dissuade po-
tential violators from entering into a deceptive practice, and extract
from actual violators a substantial sum for the deceptive dealings.
Local consumer offices and licensing apparatus are essential to
ensure consumer protection on a state-wide basis. Local consumer
offices on the county level should be created and given investigatory
and educational duties. Unfair trade practices laws, preferably
along the lines of the New York City Consumer Law of 1969, should
be adopted by all county governments. Adoption of such laws would
grant broad powers to local commissioners of consumer affairs, and
provide leverage in obtaining informal and formal resolutions of
consumer disputes.
The administration of consumer protection laws at the county
level should be centralized, and the local consumer affairs commis-
sioner should be given jurisdiction over weights and measures, and
licensing. He should be authorized to issue rules and regulations as
to licensees. With centralized administration and broad powers, a
knowledgeable local consumer office can do much to rid its locality
of deceptive practices.
A final question is whether unfair trade practices laws should be
adopted at the town level. It is submitted that they should not. The
concurrent jurisdiction of county and town governments would be
confusing. If broadly empowered consumer offices are created at the
county level, there should be no need for similar town offices. Legis-
lation at the town level should be directed toward the education of
local consumers and the discovery of existing deceptive and uncons-
cionable practices.
William F. Mulroney
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